Tampilkan postingan dengan label Space X. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Space X. Tampilkan semua postingan

Jumat, 07 September 2012

Would a Reusable Falcon Hurt SpaceX?

What happens if SpaceX is successful at achieving its Falcon reusability goals.  Here is the video of SpaceX’s plans to recover and reuse the majority of its Falcon launch system.


Let me make some assumptions about a Reusable Falcon (R-Falcon) to make my point that such a system may pose challenges for SpaceX.

On the surface, an R-Falcon would be great.  If my assumptions below are accurate, only $16M per flight, a flight every 30 days, only two thousand dollars per KG.  From a consumer perspective this would be great!  SpaceX is adding reusability to the large rockets they already have.  And they will probably be successful at it.  They do seem to achieve what they put their mind to, however, could there be an easier road to reusability?  Let’s explore the possibility.  First what could a large reusable system like SpaceX’s look like (dollars values in millions)?

  
I am still amazed we can’t build Saturn V’s today.  We built them before.  We went to the moon in them for goodness sake!  We knew how to build them…why don’t we know now?  Two major reasons:
  1. We don’t have the tooling/plans – long since destroyed or lost
  2. We don’t have the knowledge – the NASA/contractor engineers have retired/passed away
 Surely such a reusable system like the R-Falcon could avoid these Saturn-V pitfalls…right?  If you look at the table above you see I estimated SpaceX builds eight initial R-Falcons.  This high number addresses the unknowns about number of flights per R-Falcons.  Will it really be 10 flights per vehicle as I estimate?  And how long will it take technicians to refurbish and integrate the next payload? 6 weeks?  8 weeks?  With flights every month and 6-8 week refurbish and integration windows, multiple R-Falcons will be needed.

So here is the problem.

After the initial push to develop the R-Falcon fleet, at the usage rates outlined in the table, you would NOT NEED TO BUILD another R-Falcon for 6.5 years!

So SpaceX could avoid throwing away their tooling (unlike the Saturn V), but could they keep a knowledgeable team around ready to build the next R-Falcon 6.5 years after the first fleet was completed?

And even if you believe eight R-Falcons in the initial fleet is too many and want to reduce the fleet size, demand rates of one per month means SpaceX would only need to make approximately one R-Falcon per year to keep up with demand.  Not exactly mass production – 1 vehicle per year.  Can you keep the production team “sharp” on 1 vehicle per year?

How can it be, as a consumer, I love the R-Falcon (yay $2k per KG), but as a business, could the R-Falcon be a bad way to prove a reusable launch vehicle?  Could the R-Falcon launch too much payload and launch too infrequently?

Let’s talk about an alternate business approach that could address some of these challenges.  I said above that my hypothetical R-Falcon has two problems:
  •  Launching too much payload
  • Launching too infrequently
How could a new hypothetical company do reusable launch better?  What if you launch less mass but launch more often?  So let’s make up a hypothetical launch system – the “Kinglet.”  Since this is a business blog, let’s not get bogged down into the technical details except that instead of launching 7,000KG per flight, the Kinglet will launch 100KG.  And instead of paying the R-Falcon’s $5M for range access per flight, the Kinglet pays $200K per flight for its range or range-like services (airport, spaceport, other?).  Here is the table for such a system (dollars values in millions).


The Kinglet is a smaller launch system but aims for a higher flight rate, targeting weekly flights instead the R-Falcon’s monthly flight rate.  As a potential customer, I do not like the 10x higher price I pay to use Kinglet ($20K per KG vice the Falcon’s $2K).  But flying weekly may be attractive to some customers.  Overall though, this appears to be bad for customers (most customers could wait a month to fly).  But from a business perspective, all things being equal, a small reusable launch system like Kinglet has a much higher probability of success because it starts small.

Where the Falcon struggled to keep its production line open with only one new vehicle per year, the Kinglet will need to produce five systems per year to keep up with demand.  Now five launch vehicles per year is still not mass production, but those volumes will, not only keep the production team sharp, but provide five times the opportunities to roll in product and production improvements into the newer vehicles than would be possible on the R-Falcon production line.

Could a smaller reusable system avoid R-Falcon's hidden pitfalls?  Maybe.

So the last question to ask is, what needs to be launched at least weekly with a mass of under 100KG? 

Here is the excel file with tables from this post if you want to change the assumptions.

Senin, 17 Oktober 2011

Risk Pricing for the Reusable Falcon 9

In my last post I explored how the SpaceX's reusable Falcon 9 (rF9) could threaten those companies offering suborbital launch services.  

Discussion has focused on the risks preventing the rF9 from reaching the optimistic breakeven price point of $130 per kg (discussed in my last post).  Here are a few of the risk categories you have raised:

  • Increased variable costs: Elon may claim only $200K of propellant per flight, but the variable costs of an rF9 flight will surely be higher
  • Reduced number of flights: When you factor in the complexities of reusing a launch vehicle and the potential for a crash or loss of vehicle
  • Reduced payload capacity: Adding reusability will increase the mass of non-payload components – reducing the payload mass

What rF9 breakeven price points might we expect if we take these concerns into account?  In the table below, I explore these risks and their impact on breakeven price per flight and breakeven price per kg.  


In the second column are the breakeven prices today for an expendable Falcon 9.  This is the upper end of cost.  Weight any of these risks to the point you get price points beyond $5K per KG and customers will prefer the current Falcon 9 over the reusable version.  The third column shows the optimistic assumptions from my last post.  Columns four through six:

  • Increase variable cost per mission from $200K to $2M
  • Reduce reusability from 47 missions per vehicle down to only 10 missions per launch vehicle
  • Reduce payload capacity by 50% from 10,450KG to 5,225KG

These risk values give us a range we can talk about.  Even variable costs of $2M per flight, only 10 flights per vehicle, and half of the payload mass consumed with reusability hardware, SpaceX should be able to reach breakeven price points of about $1500 per KG and $7.5M per flight. 

And the great thing about risks…they get retired.  Be as pessimistic as you want to be about the capabilities of the initial versions of the rF9.  Variable costs will drop over time.  Flight rates per vehicle will rise, and payload mass will creep back up.  The key has been (and will always be) flight rates.  I wouldn't be surprised to see SpaceX subsidize their first generation rF9, offering first generation customers prices SpaceX won’t be able to satisfy profitability until the second generation rF9 – all in the name of increased flight rates.

How optimistic or pessimistic are you about rF9 capabilities?  Here is an interactive spreadsheet for you to explore your own risks and their effects on breakeven prices.    

Sabtu, 01 Oktober 2011

Will the Reusable Falcon 9 Kill the Suborbital Launch Industry?

With SpaceX’s announcement this week that the company would not only develop a reusable first stage for its Falcon 9 family of rockets but would make a completely reusable rocket system (I will use Clark Lindsey’s nomenclature: "rF9" for reusable Falcon 9), I have been wondering about the future of the young NewSpace companies developing reusable suborbital rockets.  Will companies like Masten, Armadillo and to a lesser extent XCOR and Virgin Galactic, survive this incursion from a well-funded NewSpace Cousin?


(the youtube video via Clark Lindsey's youtube channel.)  
SpaceX has announced the company is developing the “Grasshopper,” a 100 foot-tall suborbital Falcon 9 first stage that SpaceX’s cadre of young, talented engineers will use to test this initial piece of the rF9.  SpaceX has NOT announced any intention to commercialize the Grasshopper.  But if Masten, XCOR, and Armadillo continue to delay bringing a product to market that can reach 100KM, and SpaceX continues to develop products in its typical rapid fashion, might customers ask to buy payload space on an upcoming Grasshopper test?  



Or would SpaceX be willing to sell Grasshoppers to operators who then provide a suborbital launch service to users using the Grasshopper all before Masten has reached 100KM?  Could the unmanned Grasshopper be modified to carry passengers and compete with Virgin and XCOR?  If an operator came with funding, wouldn’t SpaceX take their money to make the modifications to "manrate" Grasshopper?

But the big money is the orbital market.  Most of the suborbital companies have expressed interest in using their suborbital experience and even their suborbital vehicles to expand current offerings to include an orbital system.  XCOR has published this image of an orbital capability.  



Virgin Galactic even took investment money from the Middle East to jump start their orbital program.  Could an rF9 meet all market demand for both suborbital and ultimately orbital launches as well?  And if they do, are the current suborbital companies doomed? 

It all comes down to money.

How cheaply could SpaceX really launch their new rF9?  We don’t know.  SpaceX does not even know yet.  But we can make some interesting estimates.   The heart of these projected orbital price reductions stems from reusing the rF9 like Southwest reuses its 747’s (which can fly commercially for 30 years with proper maintenance).  How many reuses is SpaceX planning on? 

At this point, the best data I have is a nugget SpaceX's CEO, Elon Musk, said this last week that he is targeting $500K trips to Mars as a market for his reusable craft.  

Let’s make some assumptions so we can approximate SpaceX’s reusability assumptions:
  1. A price for a Dragon/Falcon 9 trip to Mars will be equal to the price SpaceX is currently charging NASA for ISS visits ($130M per trip) - optimistic assumption
  2. 5 paying passengers per Mars Trip - optimistic assumption
  3. 10% profit per launch
  4. All maintenance and between-flight costs are included in the launch price - optimistic assumption

SpaceX breaks even after 47 flights (but that is a lot of assumptions).  here is a table to help visualize the math:



 Assuming a 47-flight amortization, what could be SpaceX’s breakeven price per KG to LEO?  Or to say it another way, how low would the suborbital company’s prices have to be to beat SpaceX?  

Again, let’s make some assumptions:
  1. A price for an rF9 to LEO is the same as current LEO Falcon 9
  2. Falcon 9 payload to LEO is unchanged
  3. 10% profit per launch
  4. All maintenance and between flight costs are included in the launch price.
  5. Propellant Cost per Launch = $200K
  6. rF9 breaks even after 47 flights

Based on these assumptions, SpaceX's breakeven Price to LEO for rF9 is $130 per KG or ~$1.4M per flight.  Again, here is a table to summarize how I came to this conclusion.  At the end of this post is a link to an interactive spreadsheet where you can modify these assumptions to create your own analysis.



These SpaceX prices are surely the most optimistic for the near term:
  1. What if the rF9 doesn’t get 47 flights per vehicle?
  2. What if between-flight maintenance costs for the rF9 are significant?
  3. What if payload capacity has to be significantly reduced to accommodate rF9’s reusability elements?
  4. What if near term launch demand is not high enough to fly as often as they need?
Even with the identified risks, this analysis would indicate:
  • Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for suborbital market share (especially if SpaceX sells the Grasshoppers to entrepreneur operators)
  • Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for orbital market share through extraordinarily low prices


So how can XCOR and Masten compete?  

I continue to be bullish regarding the utility of Nanosat-class launch vehicles.  When suborbital companies start offering orbital services (a second generation service), their initial orbital offerings would probably be within this Nanosat class - broadly speaking, payload space significantly under 100kg.  Is there still a market for suborbital companies to offer this type of orbital service?  Even if SpaceX may be able to now match (or beat) them on price?  

Yes.  Here is why:

Sometimes smaller is better.  The smaller vehicles these suborbital companies will eventually offer on orbit should:
  • Be easier to "fly full"– to get the $130/KG price on an rF9, you have to wait for the manifest to fill.  Not so with a smaller vehicle.  XCOR was talking about a payload of 12-20KG initially.
  • Be easier (and cost less) to maintain.
  • Be launched with less integration or preparation – this advantage is the BIG one.  XCOR talks about multiple flights on the same day, taking off and landing from existing airports.  Even if the rF9 could launch that often, it will be some time before regulations allow SpaceX to fly that often - especially if they are still flying from the Cape or Vandenberg where ops tempo is measured in "launches per month" not "launches per day".

Nanosat launchers are the future, but only if their ops tempo is fast enough to justify paying a premium for preferential launch windows.  

This advantage of the small won’t last forever.  SpaceX will keep improving its initial RLV offerings.  Spaceport operations will grow to allow for more airline-like ops tempos.  So Nanosat launch operators (today’s suborbital companies) will have to keep improving too.

But there is a market for Nanosats and it hinges now on ops tempo.  There is hope.

The bigger worry…

…is in the near term.  I mentioned earlier, I doubt SpaceX will pursue commercializing their Grasshopper suborbital vehicle.  But they may be open to selling this suborbital vehicle for others to operate.  Such a suborbital operator flying the Grasshopper would have tremendous suborbital market advantages and could be a major competitor to those suborbital companies focusing on suborbital research (Masten, Armadillo, etc.).

Suborbital companies should be worried, but not panicking.  If the reusable Falcon 9 hastens the development of viable Nanosat launchers, the industry will be doubly blessed – low launch costs from the rF9 and high ops tempo from Nanosat launchers.

Here is the interactive spreadsheet so you can build your own rF9 assumptions.

Selasa, 31 Mei 2011

Business Case for a CubeSat-based Earth Imaging Constellation

The use of Commercial Earth Imaging Satellites is growing. Individuals, corporations and governments are finding varied and unique applications for images of our planet.

Futron estimates the market for commercial earth imaging topped $1B last year (2010).


Uses of Earth Imaging:
  • Disaster Relief – think of all of the satellite images you saw after the Japan Earthquake (including the nuclear reactors)
  • Disaster avoidance - George Clooney (among others) paying to patrol boarder of north and south Sudan using Earth imaging satellites.
  • Helped with hunting down Osama bin Laden (but were any these images from commercial satellites?)
  • Food Commodities tracking – allowing traders to ask and answer questions like, “how do the wheat crops in Kansas look after last night’s hail storm?”
  • Remote Infrastructure observation – the oil industry uses it to keep track of their assets in remote locations
  • Even the US Government is turning to Commercial providers. Last year, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) awarded separate 10-year, $3.5 Billion contracts to image providers DigitalGlobe and GeoEye (these contracts are now under review).

The Commercial earth observation markets:
  1. Market #1: High-Resolution images (1.5 meters per pixel). But the cost of each satellite means providers have a limited number of satellites (usually 1-2) on orbit.
  2. Market #2: Med-Resolution images (5-7 meters per pixel) – lower quality images, but providers tend to have more satellites in orbit and may offer more spectral bands to choose from for each image and offer more frequent photo opportunities due to the higher number of satellites within the constellation.




















In a recent Nov 2010 paper, “6U CubeSat design for Earth observation with 6.5m GSD, five spectral bands and 14Mbps downlink,” author, Dr. Steven Tsitas outlines how a constellation of 6U CubeSats could serve Market #2 (frequent med-res images) competitively. (Sorry, I think you will have to buy the paper. If a reader finds a free version of the paper online, let me know and I will change the link). I hope to post an interview with Steven Tsitas soon.

But why even consider a CubeSat at all for such a mission? Here are just a few of the advantageous of using CubeSats:
  • High amount of innovation in the field – from NASA, universities, and private industry
  • Low ITAR restrictions (CubeSat programs are thriving in many nations)
  • Low mass of each satellite
  • Reduced launch cost per satellite
  • Reduced cost to replace/upgrade constellation as satellites age, breakdown, or new technology becomes available

Rapid Eye, a German company, is the current leader serving Market #2. Below I will provide some details about Rapid Eye and how a CubeSat constellation might be able to compete with Rapid Eye.  First, a little education about Rapid Eye.

Rapid Eye Details:
  • Five identical sun-synchronous Earth observation satellites
  • Five spectral bands
  • Launched in August 2008
  • Satellites built by Surrey UK
  • 650KM circular orbit
  • Captures 4mil km squared of earth’s surface every day
  • Once an order is placed for an image, can take a photo of any location on earth (between 75 degrees N and 75 degrees S) within 24 hours.
  • Offers not only images, but offers services for the analysis of images – especially good at providing comparative analysis of images taken over a period of time

Rapid Eye, the Numbers:
  • Customer price for images: $1.33 per square KM (must purchase 5,000 KM at a time (at current Euro conversation rates that is equal to $6650 per very large image)
  • Satellite Constellation construction: $35M 
  • Expected 2009 Revenue: $29.5M (have not confirmed this number)
  • Total Capital needed to break even: $224M

Assumptions about Rapid Eye’s business:
  • Assumed Rapid Eye is now profitable
  • Assumed the cost of the single Dnepr launch necessary to lift the five Rapid Eye sats: $15M
  • Assumed a $50M infrastructure Hardware purchase (ground station and other startup infrastructure)
  • Assumed a five year startup at a cost of ~$25M per year in operating (non-HW, non-infrastructure costs)













So what if we could launch a constellation of ten cubesats that could perform a very similar function as Rapid Eye’s current constellation of five small sats? Are their savings if we could? For this post, I will use Steven Tsitas’s conclusions that, yes, such a cubesat constellation would be technically possible.

I will build my business case, not from a technology discussion, but by attempting to answer the business question of - how much could an business save by using Cubesats instead of small sats?

CubeSat Venture Assumptions:
  • Cost per 6U CubeSat: $400,000
  • Number of CubeSats in constellation: 10
  • 6U CubeSat mass: 8 lbs each
  • Falcon 1 launch: $9.8M
  • SpaceX willing to prorate launch cost based on mass

If we assume the CubeSat venture would operate using the same Hardware and Operating Costs as the Rapid Eye venture, then the CubeSat savings are limited to the cost of the satellites themselves and the cost to launch them into orbit:
  • Rapid Eye’s satellite and launch costs: 23% of breakeven costs
  • CubeSat venture’s satellite and launch costs: 3% of breakeven costs
This would mean a CubeSat venture competing with Rapid Eye could theoretically lower image prices by twenty percentage points over competitors (all other things being equal). This by itself may close the business case for some CubeSat constellation investors.











But perhaps competing toe-to-toe with Rapid Eye is the wrong business model. As a general rule, it is hard to out Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart. What-if the CubeSat earth imaging venture could, instead, become the low-price, no frills, earth imaging provider?

In the earlier example, the CubeSat advantage was limited to lower satellite costs and cheaper rides to orbit on SpaceX launch vehicles. But what-if the venture could also save money on ground costs: Hardware/ground stations and operating expenses?

CubeSats, the low-cost leader in earth imaging Assumptions:
  • Continue with assumptions regarding low satellite costs
  • Continue with assumptions regarding low launch costs
  • Lower ground Hardware and Infrastructure costs from $50M to $25M
  • Lower operating costs from $25M to $10M per year.









Here is a quick cost comparison between the options:


















Next Questions (beyond the scope of this post):
  • Market price elasticity: How price sensitive is the earth imaging market? How would cutting Rapid Eye’s price by 20-60% affect demand for a CubeSat-based image product?
  • What realistic cost reduction methods are possible in ground hardware and personnel?
  • Admittedly, my Rapid Eye information was limited to publicly available data, a more serious effort should be conducted to understand the competitor’s cost structures and current profit forecasts
  • What are the cost implications from using a CubeSat-based system? Where are system costs reduced? Where are system costs increased?
  • Admittedly, images from a CubeSat are of a lower quality than the best in orbit (5-7 meters per pixel compared to 1.5 meters per pixel from the industry leaders of market #1).  How sensitive is the market to image quality?  And what can be done to increase the quality of an image taken on a 6U CubeSat?

Rabu, 06 April 2011

Falcon Heavy Impact on NewSpace

With the announcement from SpaceX yesterday about the Falcon Heavy, I went back over the recent missions I had been analyzing here at Space Business Blog to determine if any of them would benefit directly from the Falcon Heavy’s superior performance and reduced per pound launch cost.

The Answer: No. Well, mostly no.

Let me explain. Most of the innovative missions I had been considering were near term missions that could be performed on a single launch without the added capability of the Falcon Heavy.

  • CubeSat “Observers” of LEO/GEO assets – too small, mission may benefit from cheaper secondary payload prices
  • A NEO prospector mission – too small, mission may benefit from cheaper secondary payload prices
  • Nanosat Launchers – if anything, as launchers get larger, the need for a very small/responsive alternative grows, not decreases
  • LEO/GEO/L1 tug – a Falcon Heavy launch capability may actually harpoon this whole idea of a transfer tug (at least in the near term). Probably worth a new post on how the Falcon Heavy illuminates/reduces the value for such a capability
  • Refueling of Iridium’s constellation - too small, mission may benefit from cheaper secondary payload prices

But here are a few humble thoughts on why a Falcon Heavy changes the game:
  • Further NewSpace validation: Still a lot of doubt in congress that a commercial company can do rocket science – one more answer to these critics. New Space firms benefit from the validation that SpaceX creates.
  • Cheaper Secondary Payloads: With 53 metric tons to LEO available for each mission, smaller payloads could be combined to take advantage of all of that capability. This would allow more users to benefit from the $1000/lb price point, not just the big payloads.
  • Cheaper Falcon 1 and 9 missions: The Falcon family of launchers use the Merlin engine. Falcon 1, Falcon 9, and the Falcon Heavy (which could be called Falcon 27 since it uses 27 Merlins for each mission). In the announcement yesterday, Elon eluded to economies of scale coming from SpaceX making so many of these Merlin engines - 100’s per year. If the Falcon Heavy flies frequently, SpaceX will get even more experience about making many, many, many Merlin engines. The more Merlins you make, the more ways you find to make them cheaper. Yay economies of scale! The hope is that these savings result in lower prices for Falcon 1 and 9 over the long-term.
  • New mission potential: And now the obvious benefits – you can do more with any mission (more mass lifted at a lower cost). Think of the missions you can do with the raw ingredients being developed. Humans to NEOs, L1, Moon flybys, Venus/Mars flybys, and science missions to Mars and back – limited new hardware needed. The reality that a rich private citizen will soon be able to leave LEO for some impressive destinations has not been grasped by the population at large and will surprise many when such a mission is actually launched:
    • Falcon Heavy
    • Bigelow Modules
    • Dragon
    • CST-100
    • Even the Orion, and ISS
  • Commercial beats contracting: ULA could have built the rocket that SpaceX is building – they have a lot of very smart engineers. But they won’t build it (IMHO). They will wait for a contract to build one – which won’t come. Yes, they will spend their own small R&D budgets to enhance their current offerings. But they won’t spend hundreds of millions to develop a vehicle independently. And because of this, the only reason ULA will be offering launch services at all in ten years will be:
    • SpaceX can’t keep up with demand or
    • SpaceX has an accident or
    • The US govt insists on multiple launch providers to ensure access (funny they lacked that once ULA was formed) or
    • ULA’s political clout keeps them in the game – even if overpriced
    • ULA changes from a contractor to acting more like a commercial provider (the hardest switch to make)

**UPDATE:
Next Big Future offers this great cost comparison between the EELV launch costs of ULA and SpaceX:













Even if you DON'T have $80M+, the Falcon Heavy announcement changes how the whole world plans their space missions - even New Space.


Minggu, 26 Desember 2010

LEO-to-GEO Tug Part 2: Bigger than a Delta-IV Heavy

3,000kg DirecTV 12 Sat
In my last post, I showed the potential of using SpaceX’s Falcon 9 to launch a comsat to LEO and use a reusable LEO-to-GEO transfer tug to move the satellite from low earth orbit to GEO. I also described the largest satellite we can currently put into GEO in a single launch would be a 6,276kg satellite launched on a Delta-IV Heavy for $200M.

But how large of a GEO satellite would be possible using the Falcon 9/Transfer Tug architecture? And how expensive would that satellite be to launch?

Such a Falcon/tug system could launch a 10,000 kg satellite (an increase of ~59% over the current maximum comsat size) into GEO for $171-235M. The price/KG savings is significant ranging from 26-46% over the Delta-IV Heavy. In addition to cost/KG savings, no other commercial launcher can lift 10,000kg to GEO.


Here are my Assumptions:

  • Tug is launched on Falcon 9 with a dry mass of 3,000kg.
  • Tug is co-manifested on a Falcon 9. Launch cost $20M.
  • Tug Development paid for under contract and not a part of this analysis.
  • Tug Manufacturing Costs: $50M
  • Tug refuels itself as needed in LEO from additional Falcon 9 launches (10,000 kg of prop for $50M: $5,000 per kg).
  • Tug lasts five years with amortization factored into price.
  • Tug breakeven price listed in this analysis.
  • Two missions per year assumed (8% Market Share).
  • Operating Cost per year: $10M.
  • LEO to GEO: 4200 m/s of delta-v required.
  • GEO to LEO (with aerobraking): 1500 m/s of delta-v required.
  • Use aerobraking from GEO to LEO.
  • Satellite launched to LEO on a Falcon 9.

LOX/Kerosene Tug – 10,000kg to GEO details:







































LOX/Hydrogen Tug 10,000kg to GEO Details:






































Click here to play with the interactive spreadsheets.

In Part 3 of this series, I will discuss if a Falcon/Tug system could be used to take a Bigelow Sundancer Module to EML1.

Kamis, 23 Desember 2010

LEO-to-GEO Tug Part 1: Cheaper than a Delta-IV Heavy

Delta-IV Heavy
In response to recent blog posts about LEO tugs servicing Iridium’s satellite constellation, readers have been asking me about other uses for orbital tugs.

One tug use that keeps coming up in our discussions is a LEO to GEO transfer tug. Such a tug would pick up a payload in LEO and transfer the payload to GEO, drop the payload off in the correct orbit, and return to LEO for its next payload.

Although there are some intriguing propulsion technologies on the horizon that make the case for such a tug easier to close, could a transfer tug be developed today with today’ s propellants to serve the extreme ends of the GEO Satellite market (projected for the next decade to be 20-25 satellites per year)?  I focused my analysis on two GEO market segments:
  1. Smallsats (550kg) and 
  2. Mega ComSats (6,000-10,000kg)
So I did some analysis (yay, spreadsheets!).

With current propulsion, could a LEO to GEO transfer tug work for: 
  • SmallSats? NO, a LEO to GEO transfer tug could not be operated for less than the cost and performance of existing EELV rides
  • Mega ComSats? MAYBE: and the rest of this post discusses my analysis as to why an entrepreneur may find a market here.
Currently the largest GEO ComSat could theoretically have a mass of 6,276kg if launched on a Delta IV Heavy (correct me if I am missing a commercial rocket offering a larger BOL value for a GEO sat). I have heard of prices for this type of launcher ranging from $150-200M (maybe more). Since such a satellite in my example would push the boundaries of the capabilities of the Delta IV Heavy, I used the upper end price point of $200M to GEO.

I am assuming a commercial customer with a 6,276kg satellite could purchase a GEO ride on a Delta-IV Heavy for $200M. My analysis considered how to transport a 6,276kg satellite from the earth’s surface to GEO for less than $200M. 

The Falcon 9 has a LEO payload limit of 10,450kg.  My analysis assumes a Falcon 9 to launch the satellite to LEO and tug to take the satellite from LEO to GEO.  I considered two propellant options for the transfer tug:
  1. LOX/Kerosene at 340 ISP
  2. LOX/Hydrogen at 450 ISP
The table below shows the price comparison between the baselined Delta-IV and a Falcon 9/tug combo using both propellant options. 


The Falcon 9 & LOX/Hydrogen tug combo could deliver the satellite to GEO for only $142M (a cost savings of ~30%). The LOX/Kero tug at a lower ISP shows a cost savings of 6% (more if the launch costs end up being more than $200M). I am not sure 6% cost savings would overcome the risk of introducing a tug into the satellite-to-GEO equation, but 30% savings for the LOX/Hydrogen tug ($60M!!) seems pretty tempting.


Here are my Assumptions:

  • Tug is launched on Falcon 9 with a dry mass of 3,000kg.
  • Tug is co-manifested on a Falcon 9. Launch cost $20M.
  • Tug development paid for under contract and not a part of this analysis.
  • Tug manufacturing Costs: $50M.
  • Tug refuels itself as needed in LEO from additional Falcon 9 launches (10,000 kg of prop for $50M: $5,000 per kg).
  • Tug lasts five years with amortization factored into price.
  • Tug breakeven price listed in this analysis.
  • Two missions per year assumed (8% Market Share).
  • Operating Cost per year: $10M.
  • LEO to GEO: 4200 m/s of delta-v required.
  • GEO to LEO (with aerobraking): 1500 m/s of delta-v required.
  • Use aerobraking from GEO to LEO.
  • Satellite launched to LEO on a Falcon 9.
Observations:

1. Since propellant cost drives the price for this venture, true price reductions come not from increasing demand but from:
  • Decreasing propellant usage [could be solved through advances in engine technology (VASIMR)] or
  • Paying less than $5,000 per KG for propellant [could be solved through extraterrestrial sources of propellant? Or SpaceX lowering their Falcon 9 prices due to added reusability in their first stage].
2. Once in GEO, could the tug make more money after dropping off its payload and prior to returning to LEO? Two thoughts:
  • Who would pay for prox-ops work in GEO?
  • What could the tug bring back from GEO to LEO (the delta-v to return to LEO from GEO is very low with aerobraking making return payloads comparatively cheap)? Who would pay to have a payload brought back?
3. Entrepreneurs reading this would want to calculate desired IRR to determine attractiveness of opportunity to investors. I have only considered a breakeven price.
4. The Delta-IV Heavy does not fly very often. This Falcon 9/Tug solution offers increased flight opportunities in addition to the cost savings already mentioned – frequent launch opps alone may make this venture valuable to customers.
5. Because SpaceX’s Falcon 9 becomes much more attractive for Mega ComSat operators when including a tug, SpaceX may be interested in being involved in a commercial tug venture.
6. There are going to be some elements of this analysis I get wrong. Assume I made mistakes. I welcome the corrections.

LOX/Kerosene Tug Details:







































LOX/Hydrogen Tug Details:

Click here to play with the interactive spreadsheets.

In the next post in this series, I will walk through the math for a 10,000kg satellite to GEO (bigger than anything currently in GEO), and the numbers look even better – all from a Falcon 9 and a transfer tug!

Kamis, 09 Desember 2010

NanoSat Launch Vehicles: Vertical vs.Horizontal Integration

I have been talking a lot about NanoSat Launch Vehicles lately.

We spoke about the last mile problem: how to use an NLV to deliver “just in time” supplies to orbital stations.  We spoke of a variable pricing model that would charge NLV customers commensurate to what they could pay (and increase launch demand in the process).

In all of the excitement over SpaceX’s Tremendous achievement yesterday, it was easy to miss Altius Space Machine’s announcement about their recent contract to develop NanoSat Launch Vehicle tanks. Quoting from ASM’s announcement,

“I’ll be using this tank to validate some of the low-cost, lightweight manufacturing techniques that could be used for other low-pressure tanks, like pump-fed propellant tanks for suborbital vehicles or nanosat launchers. Once the development of this system is completed, it should provide a low-cost, highly capable propulsion system for high-end nanosats and microsats.”
SpaceX is vertically integrated and associates much their success to this approach – developing all aspects of their product in-house (or limiting external component suppliers).

As NASA’s NLV Challenge heats up, NLV Challenge teams are going to be faced with the same decision: do they develop all components of their NanoSat Launch Vehicle in-house or utilize suppliers like Altius Space Machines, Team Phoenicia, and others to create a vehicle capable of winning the prize.

Over the coming months I expect to see NLV Challenge teams fall into two groups:

  1. Vertically Integrated Teams: Some will follow the SpaceX model – building every component internally, controlling the supply chain. Advantages of this approach are ease of integration and schedule control. Disadvantages of this approach: Cost growth with low production volumes (perhaps cost savings with high volumes, but this would case specific), and the opportunity cost of developing components that could be purchased by others. Opportunity Cost is what you could have done with your time or money if you weren’t vertically integrated (and in such a competition, “first to market” may win it all).
  2. Horizontally Integrated Teams: Others will see an advantage of utilizing hardware developed by others. Since I expect the NLV Challenge winner will utilize several vehicle stages (Paul Breed is considering a three stage nanosat launcher), this group of competitors will outsource some stages (or components of stages) and build other stages in-house. With Horizontal Integration, the Advantages and Disadvantages are reversed. Advantages: Using components built by suppliers may get you to market faster/cheaper, and may help you raise angel funding if you can leverage pre-existing supplier hardware when pitching to investors.  Disadvantages: Integration and Schedule risk (which could be a HUGE risk for any NLV Challenge competitor)!
Jon Goff, founder of Altius Space Machines, will be on the Space Show on Monday, Dec 13. I will be listening for hints of what lightweight systems Altius may be considering that could help those considering the horizontal integration approach.

Disclaimer: I have become friends with Jon Goff from his blog, Selenian Boondocks. I have re-read this post and think the content is free of too much bias, but you be the judge.  Regardless, it should be a good Space Show interview.  Check out the Space Show's archives after Dec 13 if you can't listen live.

Senin, 06 Desember 2010

Interview with the Founder of Astronauts 4Hire


Space Stations by Bigelow & Orbital Technologies. Dragon Lab Missions by SpaceX. And more to come. The hardware is being built. Should Bigelow, and SpaceX pay to maintain an internal astronaut corp to operate their hardware or should they outsource their astronauts?

Would an internal team of astronauts be a cost center or profit center for these hardware manufacturers. 

Enter Astronauts4Hire – a commercial astronaut corp. Buy their services "by the drink". I first talked about A4H here.  Below is my interview with Astronauts4Hire's President/CEO and co-founder, Brian Shiro.


Q: Can you give us a company overview of Astronauts4Hire? The services you intend to offer? The market you are targeting?

Brian Shiro: Astronauts4Hire (A4H) targets both inward and outward-facing markets. We can illustrate this by dissecting our name into two parts: “Astronauts” and “for Hire.” “Astronauts” refers to our internally-focused activities related to building the skills of prospective commercial astronauts with the goal of creating a professional commercial astronaut workforce. The “for Hire” refers to our externally-focused activities to match commercial astronaut candidates with specific missions to be carried out on suborbital or orbital flights. Our target markets include prospective astronauts, researchers, and companies.

Services we offer internally to members focus on the professional development of members as astronaut candidates. This involves fostering communication among astronaut candidates, negotiating special pricing for training courses, and offering scholarships to flight members on a competitive basis to help pay for their astronaut training. Plus, members can gain entrepreneurial skills by getting involved on the ground floor with building the organization during this early phase of our development.

A4H offers a number of services to the external community too. A4H will work with researchers and companies to provide the manpower required to achieve mission objectives on parabolic, suborbital, and orbital flights. Primarily, the services pertain to planning and executing experiments or operating payloads on flights. It could also involve product testing or promotion, particularly for commercial clients, as is the case with the upcoming space beer flight.


Q: Describe Astronauts4Hire’s latest contract to test beer in microgravity?

Brian Shiro: A new space engineering company, Saber Astronautics Australia, teamed up with the 4-Pines Brewery in a joint venture called Vostok Pty. Ltd. to create beer brewed specifically for consumption in space. This stout-derived beer has low carbonation and high flavor, meeting known challenges the human body faces with taste and carbonation in microgravity. Initial batch recipes were taste-tested by 4-Pines and were proven safe for wholesale consumption through terrestrial sales, which will help fund the microgravity beer testing experiment. Drop tower tests conducted at the Queensland University of Technology characterized the liquid under brief, but high quality, microgravity conditions.

After considering many internal and external service providers, the Vostok partners chose Astronauts4Hire (A4H) to carry out the flight experiment. A4H selected its top four members with past microgravity research experience, and Vostok then interviewed them before settling on a primary and backup A4H research participant to carry out the experiment.

A4H is contracted to provide general support to the first human research experiment on alcohol absorption in microgravity. A4H’s primary purpose is to provide the human test subject (research participant), who has a myriad of tasks to handle before and during the flight. This includes experiment setup, pre-flight testing, data collection, and serving as a critical liaison with the ZERO G Corporation, the company that will provide the parabolic flight service. In this sense, A4H has been the team “on the ground” in the USA to support the experiment.

Vostok and A4H also collaborate on press releases and other publicity matters. We worked together with the ZERO G Corporation to negotiate many logistics details for the research flight. For example, when the original November flight was cancelled by ZERO G, Vostok and A4H worked with ZERO G to establish a new flight date in December.

The experiment itself will consist of a baseline sampling of the beer two days prior to the flight in which measurements of body temperature, heart rate, and blood alcohol content will be taken. Qualitative information such as the beer’s taste and overall drinkability will also be recorded. These same parameters will be recorded during the flight sampling. During the ZERO G flight, the A4H flight researcher will consume the beer during alternating 0-g parabolic portions of the flight.

Vostok’s ultimate goal is to be the prime supplier of beer to space tourism operators and hopes that the tests carried out by A4H will lead to the establishment of standards for the responsible, casual consumption of alcohol in space.


Q: Why did you choose to start Astronauts4Hire as a non-profit?

Brian Shiro: We arrived at the decision to become a non-profit through careful consideration of business modality alternatives. Being a non-profit fits best with our near- and intermediate-term goals of establishing A4H as the main aggregator of commercial astronaut sector stakeholders: crews, trainers, vehicles, mission elements, etc.

Like a professional organization, A4H aids its members in their professional development as astronauts through structuring of a training program, negotiation of special training prices, and awarding scholarships to members to help pay for their astronaut training. A4H is also helping establish the industry standards by which commercial astronauts will be measured. A4H will fund these activities primarily through a combination of donations, sponsorships, and grants.

Another important source of revenue for A4H includes its contracts with researchers to perform experiments on microgravity flights. This is important because it allows A4H to build experience and a customer base without having to wait until suborbital space vehicles are operational. Not only does it help us get our feet wet with providing payload operation services, it also gives our members further experience to make them more competitive astronaut candidates by the time suborbital space vehicles are ready.

If A4H were a for-profit venture, possibly having to pay back investors, we would have to charge higher prices for our services. This would not only potentially limit our clientele; it could restrict the growth of the emerging commercial astronaut market. Keeping costs low in the beginning is therefore very important, and that’s why the low overhead of a non-profit is the right track for A4H during this phase of its development.


Q: What is your long-term strategy for growing Astronauts4Hire?

Brian Shiro: The near-term plan is to finalize our business plan and federal 501(c)(3) status as a non-profit by early 2011. We will more aggressively pursue fundraising at that time and plan to start raising enough money by mid-2011 to allow us to award our initial A4H astronaut training scholarships. The pattern of raising money primarily by writing grant proposals, soliciting donors, and establishing sponsorships will continue for the next 2-4 years. We have a stepwise strategy to use money raised on a 6-month basis to pay for training activities during each subsequent half year.

In the first few years, A4H will mostly contract out its training to third parties, but by 2014 or so (after we have a few spaceflights under our belts), we plan to ramp up our internal capabilities to train ourselves too. What form this will take remains an open question, but it could include establishing a commercial astronaut training center. We plan to fund this in part by collecting registration fees at workshops, clinics, and symposia hosted by A4H on various topics related to commercial human spaceflight and suborbital research. The scope of these workshops will likely range from an introduction to commercial spaceflight for the general public in a Space Camp style to detailed technical forums for researchers to further the field.

Beyond five years, when the industry is on its feet, we can forsee possible spin-off ventures focusing on different aspects of the commercial astronaut workforce. What we know as A4H today could become more like an educational foundation, and other related businesses could handle the operational aspects of training and flight services.

Our ultimate goal is to be the main organization that provides astronaut skills training and ratings to help individuals find flight opportunities on suborbital and orbital platforms and to serve the crew needs of the commercial human spaceflight industry.


Q: What capital requirements does Astronauts4Hire have to execute your growth plan?

Brian Shiro: Our biggest assets now are our members’ time and skills, as well as the publicity we are enjoying. Capital investment so far has been light, but we have forecasted our growth requirements for the next five years. For example, we are targeting a total operating budget of approximately $81,000 in 2011 that will grow to $300,000 in 2013.

A4H needs about $150,000 in 2011 to meet its training targets, $250,000 in 2012, increasing up to just over $600,000 by 2015. On the cost side, this assumes a growth rate of 10 new flight members per year, which influences the cost of training required. On the revenue side, our forecast assumes we add at least 1-2 new “Martian” and “Lunar” donors at the $10,000 and higher level per year and earn at least one additional grant at the $50,000 level or higher per year. We also assume to add future zero gravity flight contracts like the beer flight at a rate of 3 in 2011, 5 in 2012, and so forth.


Q: What are ways the new space industry can take advantage of Astronauts4Hire’s services that they may not be thinking about or be aware of?

Brian Shiro: The space community talks a lot about “commercial crews” these days, but when most people say that, they are referring to the vehicles and engineering systems that will get people to space, not the crews themselves. Astronauts4Hire aims to fill that void by providing a professional astronaut crew service with qualified astronauts who can assume a myriad of duties on space missions.

Individuals interested in going through a structured astronaut training program can apply with Astronauts4Hire to take advantage of our relationships with training providers and connections to potential employers who may hire them later.

In the near term, we can work with researchers or companies who want to fly experiments aboard microgravity parabolic flights. Once suborbital and later orbital space vehicles are flying, we can do the same on those platforms. A4H members can serve a “guinea pigs” for flight hardware and medical testing to help establish the qualification of commercial spacecraft for human flight too. Eventually, A4H could become a prime supplier of crews to operate and maintain commercial space stations in orbit.


Q: What recommendations do you have for space entrepreneurs considering starting their own business?

Brian Shiro: Just like in real estate, what matters most is “location, location, location.” Try to be in the right place at the right time and foster a network of contacts that can help springboard your venture to success. Never underestimate the amount of time it will take to do something. If you think it’ll take a month, multiply it by 10, and you might be closer to the mark. However, that doesn’t mean the pace of progress is slow, as sometimes it can feel like you’re barely keeping your head above water just to stay afloat. Keep your eyes on the prize to maintain motivation and try to remind those working with you of the broader goals from time to time to keep up group morale. Surround yourself with a mix of “true believers” and skeptics to ensure you get a healthy mix of inspiration and grounding. For virtual organizations with members spread out geographically, as we are in A4H, leveraging modern communications technology is a key advantage, but one must be careful to ensure the tools foster efficiency rather than implementing too formal a process that could burden the pace of growth. Above all else, have fun, work hard, and you are sure to succeed!