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Senin, 16 Mei 2011

NASA's Commercial Crew/Cargo Market Assessment

NASA has released a 40-page Commercial Crew/Cargo Market Assessment for Low Earth Orbit.  RLV News pointed me to the softcopy – thanks Clark.

Here is NASA’s summary of the next ten years of projected commercial demand for cargo and crew to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) with commercial demand ranging from 7K-60K lbs of cargo and from 44 to 360 commercial astronauts.


Here are the Nuggets from NASA's assessment I found especially valuable:
  • Crew Transportation drives the overall market.
  • 4 Commercial Crew/Cargo Markets: (1) Countries lacking Space Programs, (2) Space Tourism, (3) Applied Research, (4) Other Markets – Satellite Servicing, Media, Education
  • Report looked at a ten year time horizon
  • Report excluded NASA Crew/Cargo usage - commercial usage only
  • The average ISS crew member uses 10.3 lb/cargo per day (based on historical NASA/Russian usage)
  • 4 Space Tourism Growth Constraints: (1) Crew Transport Availability, (2) Cost per customer, (3) lack of destinations besides ISS, (4) long training time
  • ISS’s Upmass Requirements 2011-2020 = 318K lbs: (1) Core Systems/Operations = 194,820 lbs, (2) Funded Research = 80,067 lbs, (3) National Lab Utilization (unfunded) = 43,266 lbs
  • Current ISS limitations as a research platform: (1) Inadequate HW/instruments to support research, (2) lack of frequent and affordable up/downmass to/from ISS
  • Report concludes that availability of up and downmass is “a major constraint to development of the market” and quotes the National Research Council as saying, “conditioned down mass of particular importance…”
  • Current research on ISS: Basic Research. Over next ten years, ISS research will gradually shift to governments paying for proof of concepts and private ventures pursuing commercialization of successful proof of concepts.
  • NASA is on contract to purchase 132K lbs of ISS cargo through 2015. According to the authors, NASA ISS cargo demand from 2016-2020 is currently flat for another 132K lbs
  • 4 Classes of Research conducted on ISS: (1) Biology/Biotech – 70% of ISS research to date, (2) Earth Observation, (3) Physical/Material Sciences, (4) Technology Development/Space Qualifying
  • United States does 36% of the research on ISS
  • But only 9% of all research on ISS to date is “Commercial” in nature – and even this “commercial” research to date has been subsidized by non-commercial sources.





Comments:
  • Although not presenting very much new data, the authors confirmed and consolidated a significant amount of commercial market data into one place
  • The authors relied heavily on industry values to determine the upper end of these markets.
  • The authors never exceeded industry's optimism.  The authors in every case established low end demand by extrapolating from history.
  • Although mentioning the critical importance of downmass to station research, the authors did not provide a downmass demand estimate for the next decade
  • I look forward to the day when commercial research on orbiting stations far exceeds the current 9%!
  • Overall, a very helpful report (if, perhaps conservative) that will stay on my shelf as a reference.

Sabtu, 15 Januari 2011

Interview with Brad Blair (Part 2) - Economics of Lunar Ice Mining

This is Part 2 of a two-part interview with Brad Blair, ISRU and lunar mining researcher. We are discussing Blair’s 2002 paper entitled “Space Resource Economic Analysis Toolkit: The Case for Commercial Lunar Ice Mining.”  Get your copy here.

In Part 1 of this interview, Brad discussed two architectures his team considered for lunar mining. In Part 2 we discuss lunar ice, nuclear vs. solar, Blair’s economic model used in paper, changes since 2002, how SpaceX has affected the business case for lunar mining and more. The images used in this blog post are from the Paper referenced above and used with permission from Brad Blair.

Q. Your baseline business case assumes 1% ice in the lunar regolith (page 34). How has recent scientific discoveries about the moon affected this assumption?

Brad Blair: The business case closed at 2% ice (note that this was one of four primary feasible conditions that caused the case to close). We ran sensitivity analysis and there is a knee in the curve starting at 0.5% and ending around 4% - see Figure 4.8 in the report. The explanation for this is that more mining and hauling equipment is needed for lower concentrations of ore, necessitating higher capital investment in the mining plant mass in order to meet productivity requirements. Above a certain concentration however other constraints tend to dominate, reducing the beneficial influence of higher ore grade or percent ice. The primary constraint above 4% ice for example is the power system mass needed to run the electrolysis system (which is needed to convert the water into hydrogen and oxygen for enough propellant to boost the payload off the lunar surface and toward the first propellant depot).

Recent scientific discoveries are of course very helpful to the business case. Turns out the ice is likely much greater than 4%, and may even approach 100% in localized high-grade zones. That does simplify the production model a bit, and will clearly have a positive effect when it is time for the engineers to design the details of the lunar surface facilities. One other aspect is the recent discovery of evidence that nitrogen and carbon ices may also exist. For human habitation Nitrogen becomes an important element due to its buffering effect for the air we breathe. It simplifies a lot of life support issues because it is well understood here at home. For long term habitation, a pure oxygen environment is problematic and other buffering gases can cause problems. Carbon opens up a lot of possible secondary products such as liquid storable hydrocarbon fuels like kerosene. It also could be used for manufacturing plastics or other organic chemicals needed for industrial uses.

However we desperately need to verify the remote sensing geophysics with ground truth. Geophysicists will admit to you that there is a given amount of uncertainty in their conclusions due to measurement taken from orbit. While we know a lot about specific equatorial lunar conditions due to the Apollo missions, the "ground truth" available to calibrate spacecraft sensors at those locations is not applicable to polar sites due to extreme environmental differences.

A RTG-powered surface rover mission in a lunar polar crater is a critical next step in proving technical and economic feasibility. Note that the first surface rover could provide sufficient ground truth to begin the harvesting of much more detailed understandings from the existing polar spacecraft data sets. LCROSS is a prime example of this.

Q. To power your lunar mining facility you baselined nuclear power but were considering a new generation of solar power as well. What is your current preferred lunar power source and why?

Brad Blair: Nuclear power is the key to steady-state mining and mineral processing operations. The reason for this is that other that wear & abrasion, most of the problems with mining equipment happen when the equipment is turned off and then back on. For equipment operating in locations that are only 25 Kelvin this will likely be exacerbated, especially since engineers currently like to design spacecraft components to operate at laboratory temperatures. Electronic systems are particularly hard hit when they are cooled to that level and then re-heated (thermal stresses in a complex array of materials tend to cause components to pop out of circuit boards for example).

The simplest solution is to keep things warm of course. That requires a steady source of power. For rover missions that means using an RTG. The Mars Science Lander mission will be able to operate day and night because it has an excellent power source.

In order to make solar power work at the same level of robustness and availability, batteries are required that are sized to survive the night. Even the best locations on the Moon have significant periods of shadow, thus the mass of the batteries quickly becomes the dominant constraint. Add to that the requirement to somehow get the power into permanent shadow and technical risk goes exponential due to systems complexity. In order to make solar power work for a mining plant inside a permanently shadowed crater it will require extending the current technology envelope with a number of serial breakthroughs. Nuclear power plants for space have a long heritage (especially considering the Russian experience) and actually work better in cold conditions.

Having said all of that, solar power does have an upside potential due to the potential for geometric growth under the conditions of in-situ production. Alex Ignatiev of the University of Houston has figured out a way to make low-grade solar cells using 99.9% lunar materials.

I would consider nuclear power the best baseload supply option and use in-situ solar for peak power while the sun is shining.

Q. Describe the excel tool used in much of your analysis. Is this a tool you developed? If starting over would you use Excel again or would you recommend an alternate tool? What were the pros and cons of using this Excel?

Brad Blair: The benefits of developing a spreadsheet-based modeling tool is that it is simple, transparent and the software to run it is accessible to most people. Given the overall simplicity of the math, spreadsheets are the most common tool used for financial analysis. Plug-ins can be purchased for decision analysis, Monte-Carlo simulation, econometric statistical analysis or other higher mathematical functions. It is also relatively straightforward to set up linear or integer programming optimization models using the tools within a typical spreadsheet. The cost modeling was done using NAFCOM under a license granted through the NASA contract.

From the perspective of the parametric engineering model, interconnected spreadsheets offer a simple and transparent way to model linear or geometric behavior for estimating mass and power requirements based on unit mass and power assumptions made by selecting appropriate analogies. Detailed design would of course take advantage of the great strides made in the last 20 years in modeling and simulation of the physical, chemical, thermal and electrical behavior of materials and integrated systems. Many tools are available for this today including a growing library of open-source code. I spent some time in the real-time simulation world and the tools there are amazing, considering the fact that they can leverage dedicated parallel real-time graphics or physics processing units (GPUs or PPUs) paid for by the gaming industry.



Q. Have any entrepreneurs shown interest in turning your analysis into a lunar venture?

Brad Blair: Yes. However I have signed a confidentiality agreement, and am not at liberty to disclose the details.

Q. What has changed since this 2002 analysis to make your lunar mining business case more attractive to investors?

Brad Blair: There are much higher lunar resource grades than previously expected, a wider variety of ores and a greater confidence in the geologic models due to recent lunar missions than at any time in the past. In addition, the steady migration of silicon valley capital and entrepreneurs into the space world provides a much broader base for the emergence of new space markets – the key to a sustainable set of interlocked enterprises that will steadily develop the space frontier for human settlement and commerce. Finally, steady progress in new technologies has been made by NASA, the aerospace industry and international partners, demonstrably lowering costs as evidenced by SpaceX among many others. Indeed, I sense a tipping point may be drawing close.

Q. What has changed since this 2002 analysis to make your lunar mining business case less attractive to investors?

Brad Blair: Lower product price, thus lower revenue as you pointed out in question above about SpaceX’s reduced launch price. Also, the manifold risk elements are becoming more transparent. This second item is good in my opinion because I prefer rationality to ebullience and don’t really like surprises.

Q. For the return trip from GEO to LEO you assume you will be aerobraking. You use 500m/s for this return trip with the aerobraking assumption. But to leave GEO and return to LEO you would first have to do the circularizing burn in reverse (1300-1700m/s) and then you could aerobrake into Earth's atmosphere. If my understanding were correct your analysis would need to add an extra 800-1200m/s for each OTV GEO to LEO trip. Which value do you think is correct?

Brad Blair: Your numbers sound right, but remember I am a mining engineer and an economist by training. Some of our delta-V numbers were guesses. The team lacked an orbital mechanic, so we did the best we could. To the team the most important challenge was to make an end-to-end engineering and economic model that was interconnected – that was our real innovation. By making our assumptions transparent, we knew the model could be updated in the future. The impact of higher delta-Vs is an increase in propellant requirements to deliver the same level of service. This will increase the throughput of the ISRU plant and bump the transport vehicle flight rates somewhat upward as well. In short, it will increase the ops and capital costs somewhat.

Q. What should I have asked you that I did not?

Brad Blair: Lunar dust will be a major issue to overcome. Fortunately it may be susceptible to electrodynamic forces and could therefore be “steered” away from critical systems such as sensors, thermal management surfaces, solar panels and bearing seals. The same challenges will plague surface robotic missions by the way. Early demonstration of mitigation techniques will play a critical role in reducing risk.

Emerging markets (beyond orbital debris as mentioned above) will be another very important consideration for business planning. But that is a separate conversation.

Finally, one of the most important elements of the 2002 study in my opinion was the feasibility conditions that would attract private investment. We changed four primary variables to achieve feasibility. The first variable was ice concentration as discussed above. The second variable was development costs. We dialed those down to zero, assuming that a NASA program would develop ISRU for a human lunar mission and hand the technology to a private operator. This has already started under Constellation. The third assumption was that production costs would be 40% of what NAFCOM said the government would normally pay. An argument can be made that if paperwork and overhead costs can be reduced this may be possible, particularly for a private company. The final assumption was that the market size doubled. This could be achieved by engaging customers in “emerging markets”.

Q: How has your background prepared for this lunar analysis?

Brad Blair: In mid-2003 I was working with a small team of grad students under the leadership of Mike Duke, the director of the CSM Center for Commercial Applications of Combustion in Space or CCACS. Were working for NASA-RASC developing a human ISRU architecture with engineers at JSC, KSC and Glenn. In January of 2004 EV was announced and we were stunned, being the largest academic group actively studying in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) under NASA contract. Most of the team converted to join Lockheed-Martin's team for the CE&R. I left the group to join Raytheon's Senior Advisory Board for their CE&R architecture. We also gave copies of our models to t-Space. Four of the 11 CE&R contractors used ISRU as an element of their lunar architectures (see links below).


Since that time CCACS has changed names to become the CSM Center for Space Resources (CSR) and is now run by Angel Abbud-Madrid. Mike Duke has retired. CSR remains actively involved in NASA and international space agency ISRU programs and enjoys an excellent reputation as an active CSM research arm. While I remain affiliated with the Center, I have gone primarily into consulting since that time.

As a member of the CE&R advisory board to Raytheon I helped bring the ISRU element to their lunar architecture. I also participated in the analysis of related space commercialization opportunities, helping to call a meeting with other CE&R participants to investigate commercial spinoffs enabled by what would become the Constellation program. This meeting directly lead to the formation of the first space investment summit, a project that continues to this day. Finally, in 2005 I helped the Raytheon team pitch the Texas Governor's Economic Development Office on the merits of a Texas-lead commercial LEO propellant depot with the help of the NASA Innovative Partnership Program.

In 2006-2007 I worked for DigitalSpace corporation on SBIRs related to simulating lunar mining and robotic systems using real-time open-source software, and for Bechtel Nevada as a consultant on lunar base simulation and design for NASA-SOMD. I then went underground for about 1 1/2 years, found a private investor, and began developing proprietary technology for the Centennial Challenges program for the power beaming, MoonRox and excavation contests.

The first contest attempt was short lived when my partner Dr. Bernard Eastlund (who holds the patents on the HAARP array in Alaska) passed away. The second shot (MoonROx) ended up developing a lot of IP, but was put on hold for the third contest with the assumption that it would be renewed - so far this has not happened. For the third contest I partnered with a Canadian R&D outfit who raised $250k and built a very sophisticated system for the Lunar Excavation Centennial Challenge. We placed in the contest but did not win. In 2009 I spent a year working with Penguin Automated Systems of Sudbury, Canada writing a report on ISRU for the CSA. My most recent work has been working with a handful of entrepreneurial startup companies and with a law firm that is creating workable solutions for space commerce, governance and property rights.

Kamis, 13 Januari 2011

Interview with Brad Blair (Part 1) - Economics of Lunar Ice Mining

Mining on the Moon is an exciting topic.
  1. Advances in remote mining technologies,
  2. recent announcements about the volume of ice on the moon, and
  3. progress from GLXP teams
has encouraged me to consider the near-term economics of lunar mining.  Brad Blair has been a very helpful resource to me as I learn more about this potentially lucrative future space market.

This is Part 1 of a two-part interview with Brad Blair as we discuss his 2002 paper entitled “Space Resource Economic Analysis Toolkit: The Case for Commercial Lunar Ice Mining.” Get your copy here.

In the interview below, Brad provides an overview of several lunar ice-mining architectures his team considered with a goal to make commercial lunar mining possible and profitable. I ask Blair how the recent success of SpaceX and the increased quantities of lunar data and water have effected this analysis.

In preparing this paper, Brad was very deliberate to provide not only his conclusions but also his assumptions. Readers of his paper will find the added detail quite helpful in developing their own models. Brad welcomes the feedback. The images used in this blog post are from the paper referenced above and used with permission from Brad Blair.

Who is Brad Blair? Dedicated to opening the space frontier for human settlement and commerce, Brad has spent twenty years developing technical and economic systems to enable planetary surface in-situ resource utilization (ISRU). As a professional space consultant to NASA, Bechtel Nevada, Raytheon and the Canadian Space Agency, he has authored or co-authored a number of technical reports and over 50 conference papers on topics related to accessing the wealth of space for the benefit of mankind. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Engineering Geology, and Master's degrees in Mining Engineering and Mineral Economics from the Colorado School of Mines.

And now Part 1 with Brad...

Q. You describe your analysis as a combined engineering and financial model. You say in your paper, “an architecture optimized from an engineering point of view is not necessarily the most interesting for private investors.” What do you mean by this?

Brad Blair: Investors typically care a lot more about return on invested capital than about optimized hardware or new technology. An example can be found in the story of the development for NASA of a brand name space pen. A typical ballpoint pen is gravity fed, with the ink reservoir replenished due to storing it in the proper orientation. A special space pen was developed for NASA using a small pressurized bladder to ensure fluid flow in the proper direction under microgravity conditions. While engineers were able to successfully implement an elegant technical solution, the process required substantial amount of R&D with its associated cost. Production models are also costly due to the complexity of the system, and indeed can be found in many NASA Center gift stores. The Russian solution was to use a pencil. Commercial space enterprises will use pencils or other commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware wherever possible. Cost optimization is very different than technical or engineering optimization.

Q. Your analysis described two main architectures. Describe these for us and how you came to favor these two options for profitably mining lunar ice.

Brad Blair: First I must point out that under the baseline starting conditions neither of the architectures showed profitability. Our process was to start with realistic assumptions and "worst case" costs (i.e., what a government space program would pay to develop all new hardware) and then relax the assumptions until an ROI was achieved that would attract private capital. The second architecture was slightly better than the first when these more relaxed or liberal conditions were modeled. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 of the report show pictures of the architectural elements and configurations.

For both architectures we assumed:
  1. a robotic lunar ISRU plant operating in the polar ice. Vehicles included
  2. a cargo lander,
  3. a lunar tanker and
  4. an OTV for carrying propellant and cargo.

The primary difference between architectures:

  1. Architecture 1 had two propellant depots (one at L1 and one in LEO) and
  2. Architecture 2 had only one (at L1).

According to our estimated delta-Vs, there was a slight advantage to operating a single propellant depot at L1 due to its ability to fall into various inclinations without a major penalty, thus increasing the number of customers that could be reached by a small set of vehicles and systems elements.



  
Q. The goal of your architectures is to be able to offer satellite transport from LEO to GEO via space tug for $25K/kg (with a preferred target price of $20K/kg). You also mention the counter intuitive fact that reduced launch costs actually hurt your business case. With Falcon 9’s price already at about $22K/kg to GEO (4540kg to GTO, $50M price, assume half GTO mass is kick-stage), how does such low launch prices affect your business case for lunar-based propellant?

Brad Blair: There would of course be a direct downward impact on revenue (it would be cut roughly in half according to your numbers above) given that the technical, cost and market assumptions of the 2002 study remain steady. However, a premium could be assessed for transferring payloads beyond the reach of the current fleet of expendable rockets.

For example, until someone builds another heavy lift vehicle there is only one way to move a 10 ton payload to GEO with today’s technology, and that would be by refueling an upper stage in LEO or by docking with an OTV that had a full tank (perhaps launched separately without a payload attached). In that case, the price backstop would be how much it costs to conduct the ops from Earth with all expendable systems – very costly if an HLLV is chosen and the development costs are amortized over the first few flights. The gist is that the revenue model for the 2002 study is fairly simplistic, and that updating it could involve both upward and downward adjustments in revenue streams. In either case the point is that the revenue model was based on estimating the cost of a terrestrial competitor for a specific mission profile and discounting that value a bit. Thus price can be modeled in a straightforward fashion using the same approach for future models.

Q. You argue in the Annual Market Demand section of your paper, “a thorough study should estimate the potential for new markets emerging from the availability of the space resource.” Talk about emerging markets for lunar resources and how influential emerging markets would play if you were to consider an update to your analysis.

Brad Blair: Emerging markets will make or break the business case. They are where the real action is at. It is an unreasonable expectation that current launch providers will simply give up their existing market share for LEO to GEO transfer and join the bandwagon. It will be an uphill battle and not be easy to win. Having said that, if sufficient additional customer demand can be stimulated in order to actually increase throughput of space vehicles in existing factories and benefit not only the propellant provider but launch vehicle manufacturers as well, a win-win scenario could emerge that will benefit all involved.

For example, a radical shift in on-orbit operations cost would enable orbital debris cleanup. I personally consider debris management the killer app or airmail of the 21st Century. As evidenced by the recent collision of Cosmos 2251 with Iridium 33, there is a growing danger of an exponentiating number of objects larger than 10cm. We are closer than many want to acknowledge to a chain reaction that could wipe out needed orbits for centuries or even millennia. With current technology it would become impossible for humans to penetrate the debris clouds that would result from a runaway reaction. Something needs to be done now, yet the excuse "it is just too costly" frequently emerges.

Reusability and propellants could change that dynamic. In my opinion, an international escrow account should be created and funded by some combination of the polluters and beneficiaries of cleanup. This would then be used to create a bounty on certain types of orbital debris. Then the marketplace itself would determine the best solutions to cleanup. If no takers emerge the first year, increase the bounty. If too many show up, decrease it. Once the coffers are empty wait until next year and they fill up again. It would be a self-regulating system that would begin to put a dent into one of the biggest "elephants in the room." Forget about the dangers of radiation - getting hit with a piece of gravel or a baseball going 10km/s is instant "game over" for an astronaut or spacecraft.





Q. You mention public/private partnerships in your paper. How dependent will lunar pioneers be on such financing that blends Government and investor money?

Brad Blair: Public private partnerships can be used to reduce various types of risk, thereby accelerating a commercial development timeline. For example, government investment in technology development could reduce operations risk and increase mission safety. Donation of time at costly lab facilities (e.g. large thermal vacuum chambers) could help space qualify commercial systems, reducing technical risk. Government-backed debt (e.g. bonds) could help reduce financing risk. Government anchor tenancy for products or services could reduce market risk. It is not as much an issue of dependency so much as the government having an ability to prime the pump and accelerate the schedule.

The trade off here is that by investing in certain ways the government can steer the outcome toward a beneficial public purpose. So there is a payoff to the taxpayer as well. For example, a private lunar mining outpost might make an excellent base camp for NASA human lunar exploration missions. Another example would be to incentivize data collection for potentially hazardous asteroids in partnership with a mineral exploration venture. In the end it doesn't matter whether the asteroid is mined into a new orbit or abruptly blasted out of the path of a dangerous keyhole. By combining effort, costs could be reduced on both the public and private side of the equation. A recommended criteria for entering a partnership is that both sides should benefit.

Q. Your analysis assumes no human miners involved on the lunar surface – all robotic. Describe how you came to this conclusion and if you still hold to this “human-free” approach to lunar mining.

Brad Blair: It was a simplifying assumption at first. It would certainly have a downward pressure on cost if it works. The reason I still believe it is possible is that I spent much of 2008 working with Dr. Greg Baiden of Sudbury, Canada writing an ISRU report for the Canadian Space Agency. While the report is still embargoed, it does conclude that robotic preparation of an underground human habitat does appear feasible.

This is based on Greg's experience as VP of research and development for INCO in the early 1990's, where he demonstrated that several pieces of underground mining equipment in two different mines could be run simultaneously from one operator cabin on the surface. The latency in the signal to and from the underground equipment approached 1.7 seconds. Estimates for lunar operations are in the 2.5 second ballpark. Based on that experience communication lag time may not be a major issue. You can listen here to a 2 hour interview with Greg at the Space Show.

The second hurdle will be maintenance and repair (which can and should be implemented for satellites as soon as possible by the way). It turns out that one of the reasons that terrestrial mining equipment breaks down so often is because the cost of repair is minimal. It should be possible to design lunar mining equipment to operate in a much more robust fashion and demonstrate the ruggedness in thermal vacuum with simulated lunar soils. Another important step would be to instrument a lunar surface exploration rover with wear and abrasion sensors in order to implement and get feedback on solutions before the mining equipment arrives. Estimates for the 2002 study were that 10% of equipment mass would need to be replaced per year. We even included in the model a 1 ton repair robot with the sole task of maintenance.

Rabu, 20 Oktober 2010

Designing RLVs with the Lowest Life-Cycle Cost

This was the Space Shuttle we wanted:
The Shuttle parked in the hanger.  Integration for the next mission was supposed to be comparable to Southwest Airlines loading my luggage (maybe I exaggerate a little).  This is the Space Shuttle we got:

The Shuttle requires between 200,000 and 400,000 human maintenance hours between each flight! You can barely see the shuttle in the picture above because of the scaffolding surrounding and incasing the vehicle.

Shuttle experts can (and have) elaborated more eloquently than I could on the reasons why the Space Shuttle reusability goals fell so short. But as we prepare for suborbital RLV operations (and hopefully orbital operations) in the not so distant future, I wanted to discuss the implications of an interesting paper by SpaceWorks Engineering (Michael J. Kelly, et al) and its implications for the costs of RLV design & operations.

The paper is called, What’s Cheaper to Fly: Rocket or TBCC? Why?  In it, SpaceWorks compares two hypothetical RLV designs (one rocket-based and one turbine-based) and discusses the expected operational costs of both systems. Both designs made the following RLV performance assumptions:
  • Fleet of three unmanned RLV vehicles
  • Fleet flies monthly (12/yr)
  • Every 10 flights, RLVs spend 6-mo in offsite heavy maintenance facility
  • 100 nautical mile LEO orbit
  • Payload 20K lb.
What I found interesting was what ratio the paper’s authors leveraged from the Space Shuttle program to include in their analysis.  The Shuttle utilizes seven support personnel for every one technician in their maintenance and integration efforts. For every one technician preparing the Space Shuttle for its next mission, there are seven individuals supporting that technician. This support staff consists of mission specialists, engineering support personnel, etc. Using this 7:1 ratio, the SpaceWorks paper estimated the need for RLV technicians and then extrapolated the number of support personnel needed.

Using the SpaceWorks rocket-based RLV as an example, below are the costs associated with preparing the rocket for its second flight:


Ignore the exact dollars but pay attention to the percentage. 91% of all “between flight” costs is labor using the 7:1 assumption. Stop worrying about fuel cost – start creating low-maintenance designs.  Of course there are other costs that go into the price of an RLV launch: range costs, fixed cost amortization, development cost amortization, etc. But you can see how critical life-cycle costs become in RLV design discussions.

Quoting the paper, “Any program that can do better than 7:1 will probably save significant money over a program that cannot.” And “In addition to considering operational impacts when selecting engines and TPS materials, vehicle designers should strive to eliminate the need for centralized hydraulics, and for auxiliary power units.”

For example, here is what maintenance and integration costs could look like at various improvements to the Shuttle’s 7:1 support personnel to technicians ratio (all other assumptions unchanged):


I end this post with a quote from Byron Ellis, Executive Director of the Jethro Project, on life-cycle cost and Government Acquisition (just as applicable for RLV designers as Government acquisition agents):

“Executive Order 13123 requires government agencies to use life cycle cost analysis (LCCA) to minimize the government’s cost of ownership. Unfortunately, many stakeholders do not understand the concept of cost and proceed to minimize project acquisition (first) cost, rather than total project cost. However, over the life of the project, facility management cost is often two to three times higher than acquisition costs. Therefore, it is essential to design for minimum facility management cost.”

Senin, 04 Oktober 2010

Review: Suborbital Market Overview and Application of Disruption Theory

In a recent paper, Ken Davidian of the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation, and Jeff Foust of the Futron Corporation have applied Clayton Christensen’s Disruptive Innovation Theory to the suborbital launch industry, predicting the impact of RLV’s on the suborbital market by describing the impacts from multiple technology introduction strategies. The resulting paper provides significant insight.

First a quick summary of Christensen’s Disruptive Innovation Theory (think of this as three strategic options for RLV companies entering the suborbital launch market):
  1. Sustaining Innovation: As an RLV company, enhance one of the current sounding rocket capabilities. Fly higher, reduce g-forces on payloads, reduce cost of launch, reduce purchase-to-launch cycle times, etc. Competition from incumbents will be high. Marketing Risk will be low (you already know the market exists).
  2. Low-End Disruptive Innovation: As an RLV company, offer a lower price than sounding rockets and offer an inferior product (e.g. by not flying as high as a sounding rocket - early RLV’s will offer fewer minutes of quality micro-gravity). Competition from incumbents will be low since this strategy steals the lower margin portion of the market (those customers wanting “a deal”). The incumbent will instead focus on the high-margin portion of the market. Marketing Risk will be low.
  3. New Market Disruptive Innovation: Offer a new capability not offered by sounding rockets. Fly people, return experiments at mission end, fly more than once per day, etc. Incumbents will not be able to compete in the near-term in most cases since current sounding rockets do not offer such capabilities. Marketing risk will be high since new market disruptive innovation must pursue “non-customers” – those not currently served by sounding rockets.
Here are some nuggets from the paper:
  • The paper argues in favor of Low-End Disruptive Innovation as a preferred strategy for Government customers to support RLV operators – encouraging use of RLV services even before the capabilities of such RLV services fully meet Government needs (or fully matches sounding rocket capabilities). The authors argue this is the best way to help grow a sustainable industry.
  • Quoting studies from Christensen’s book, Innovator’s Dilemma, new RLV companies would garner a significant first mover advantage by pursuing either of the disruptive innovation strategies mentioned above: new entrants in an established market were successful only 6% of the time while “first mover” new entrants pursuing disruptive innovation strategies were successful 37% of the time. The first move advantage is large!
  • The paper considered “low-end” suborbital markets to be: earth remote sensing, astronomical & atmospheric observations, technology demonstrations, educational payloads, and novelty payloads that can be performed with only one minute of quality microgravity.
  • Since 1942, suborbital sounding rocket altitudes are grouped into three categories: 100 kilometers (4 min of microgravity), 300 kilometers (10 min of microgravity), and 300-1500 kilometers (astronomical observation mostly) – with the majority huddled into the 100-300 kilometer range.
  • The paper predicts according to Christensen’s Disruptive Innovation Theory, early RLV’s will use proprietary technology and be highly integrated, but as more RLV competitors join the market, RLV products will become more modular.

If I had a critique, it would be:
The authors assume the suborbital market would have a large enough “high-margin” market segment to allow incumbents to thrive even while surrendering the low-margin segments to RLV’s. Let’s assume the high-end segment of the suborbital market is any mission significantly over 100 kilometers and the low-end segment is 0-100 kilometers. Looking at the powerful graph on page 11 of their paper, it is clear that the suborbital market is already disproportionately skewed toward the “low-end” portion of the market (although the higher altitude market does appear to be growing). Just by eyeballing the graph I would estimate 35-45% of the suborbital market is 100 kilometers or lower. Would incumbent sounding rockets be able to charge a large enough premium for launches above 100 kilometers to justify losing 35-45% of the market and not retaliate through lower prices?

Remember, I am not doubting the success of RLV introduction into the suborbital market. Instead I am raising doubts on one of the authors’ key conclusions that the sounding rocket incumbents will flee up market rather than retaliate with lower prices. I am not sure the market is large enough for the incumbent to do that. If not, I would expect sounding rocket companies to lower prices to compete with RLV’s even up to 100 kilometers. If, as an RLV operator, you agree with my critique, “New Market” disruptive innovation strategies (although higher marketing risk) may actually make more sense since sounding rockets would not be able to emulate the new RLV-enabled capabilities (in the near-term).

I am a big fan of Clayton Christensen and believe his disruptive innovation theories (especially low-end disruptive innovation) would more perfectly apply to an analysis of Nanosat launchers as a disruptive orbital launch technology. But with that said, Davidian and Foust’s paper provides a great overview of Christensen’s theories and provides significant insight into the future of the suborbital market. And let’s not forget, this is primarily a government paper written to provide recommendations to the US Government on how best they can promote this industry – I do very much like that!