Would a Reusable Falcon Hurt SpaceX?

Would a Reusable Falcon Hurt SpaceX?

Sepatuads.com   September 07, 2012   Comment  

What happens if SpaceX is successful at achieving its Falcon reusability goals.  Here is the video of SpaceX’s plans to recover and reuse the majority of its Falcon launch system.

Let me make some assumptions about a Reusable Falcon (R-Falcon) to make my point that such a system may pose challenges for SpaceX.

On the surface, an R-Falcon would be great.  If my assumptions below are accurate, only $16M per flight, a flight every 30 days, only two thousand dollars per KG.  From a consumer perspective this would be great!  SpaceX is adding reusability to the large rockets they already have.  And they will probably be successful at it.  They do seem to achieve what they put their mind to, however, could there be an easier road to reusability?  Let’s explore the possibility.  First what could a large reusable system like SpaceX’s look like (dollars values in millions)?

  

I am still amazed we can’t build Saturn V’s today.  We built them before.  We went to the moon in them for goodness sake!  We knew how to build them…why don’t we know now?  Two major reasons:

1. We don’t have the tooling/plans – long since destroyed or lost
2. We don’t have the knowledge – the NASA/contractor engineers have retired/passed away

 Surely such a reusable system like the R-Falcon could avoid these Saturn-V pitfalls…right?  If you look at the table above you see I estimated SpaceX builds eight initial R-Falcons.  This high number addresses the unknowns about number of flights per R-Falcons.  Will it really be 10 flights per vehicle as I estimate?  And how long will it take technicians to refurbish and integrate the next payload? 6 weeks?  8 weeks?  With flights every month and 6-8 week refurbish and integration windows, multiple R-Falcons will be needed.

So here is the problem.

After the initial push to develop the R-Falcon fleet, at the usage rates outlined in the table, you would NOT NEED TO BUILD another R-Falcon for 6.5 years!

So SpaceX could avoid throwing away their tooling (unlike the Saturn V), but could they keep a knowledgeable team around ready to build the next R-Falcon 6.5 years after the first fleet was completed?

And even if you believe eight R-Falcons in the initial fleet is too many and want to reduce the fleet size, demand rates of one per month means SpaceX would only need to make approximately one R-Falcon per year to keep up with demand.  Not exactly mass production – 1 vehicle per year.  Can you keep the production team “sharp” on 1 vehicle per year?

How can it be, as a consumer, I love the R-Falcon (yay $2k per KG), but as a business, could the R-Falcon be a bad way to prove a reusable launch vehicle?  Could the R-Falcon launch too much payload and launch too infrequently?

Let’s talk about an alternate business approach that could address some of these challenges.  I said above that my hypothetical R-Falcon has two problems:

•  Launching too much payload
• Launching too infrequently

How could a new hypothetical company do reusable launch better?  What if you launch less mass but launch more often?  So let’s make up a hypothetical launch system – the “Kinglet.”  Since this is a business blog, let’s not get bogged down into the technical details except that instead of launching 7,000KG per flight, the Kinglet will launch 100KG.  And instead of paying the R-Falcon’s $5M for range access per flight, the Kinglet pays $200K per flight for its range or range-like services (airport, spaceport, other?).  Here is the table for such a system (dollars values in millions).

The Kinglet is a smaller launch system but aims for a higher flight rate, targeting weekly flights instead the R-Falcon’s monthly flight rate.  As a potential customer, I do not like the 10x higher price I pay to use Kinglet ($20K per KG vice the Falcon’s $2K).  But flying weekly may be attractive to some customers.  Overall though, this appears to be bad for customers (most customers could wait a month to fly).  But from a business perspective, all things being equal, a small reusable launch system like Kinglet has a much higher probability of success because it starts small.

Where the Falcon struggled to keep its production line open with only one new vehicle per year, the Kinglet will need to produce five systems per year to keep up with demand.  Now five launch vehicles per year is still not mass production, but those volumes will, not only keep the production team sharp, but provide five times the opportunities to roll in product and production improvements into the newer vehicles than would be possible on the R-Falcon production line.

Could a smaller reusable system avoid R-Falcon's hidden pitfalls?  Maybe.

So the last question to ask is, what needs to be launched at least weekly with a mass of under 100KG? 

Here is the excel file with tables from this post if you want to change the assumptions.

Risk Pricing for the Reusable Falcon 9

Risk Pricing for the Reusable Falcon 9

Sepatuads.com   Oktober 17, 2011   Comment  

In my last post I explored how the SpaceX's reusable Falcon 9 (rF9) could threaten those companies offering suborbital launch services.  

Discussion has focused on the risks preventing the rF9 from reaching the optimistic breakeven price point of $130 per kg (discussed in my last post).  Here are a few of the risk categories you have raised:

• Increased variable costs: Elon may claim only $200K of propellant per flight, but the variable costs of an rF9 flight will surely be higher
• Reduced number of flights: When you factor in the complexities of reusing a launch vehicle and the potential for a crash or loss of vehicle
• Reduced payload capacity: Adding reusability will increase the mass of non-payload components – reducing the payload mass

What rF9 breakeven price points might we expect if we take these concerns into account?  In the table below, I explore these risks and their impact on breakeven price per flight and breakeven price per kg.  

In the second column are the breakeven prices today for an expendable Falcon 9.  This is the upper end of cost.  Weight any of these risks to the point you get price points beyond $5K per KG and customers will prefer the current Falcon 9 over the reusable version.  The third column shows the optimistic assumptions from my last post.  Columns four through six:

• Increase variable cost per mission from $200K to $2M
• Reduce reusability from 47 missions per vehicle down to only 10 missions per launch vehicle
• Reduce payload capacity by 50% from 10,450KG to 5,225KG

These risk values give us a range we can talk about.  Even variable costs of $2M per flight, only 10 flights per vehicle, and half of the payload mass consumed with reusability hardware, SpaceX should be able to reach breakeven price points of about $1500 per KG and $7.5M per flight. 

And the great thing about risks…they get retired.  Be as pessimistic as you want to be about the capabilities of the initial versions of the rF9.  Variable costs will drop over time.  Flight rates per vehicle will rise, and payload mass will creep back up.  The key has been (and will always be) flight rates.  I wouldn't be surprised to see SpaceX subsidize their first generation rF9, offering first generation customers prices SpaceX won’t be able to satisfy profitability until the second generation rF9 – all in the name of increased flight rates.

How optimistic or pessimistic are you about rF9 capabilities?  Here is an interactive spreadsheet for you to explore your own risks and their effects on breakeven prices.    

Will the Reusable Falcon 9 Kill the Suborbital Launch Industry?

Will the Reusable Falcon 9 Kill the Suborbital Launch Industry?

Sepatuads.com   Oktober 01, 2011   Comment  

With SpaceX’s announcement this week that the company would not only develop a reusable first stage for its Falcon 9 family of rockets but would make a completely reusable rocket system (I will use Clark Lindsey’s nomenclature: "rF9" for reusable Falcon 9), I have been wondering about the future of the young NewSpace companies developing reusable suborbital rockets.  Will companies like Masten, Armadillo and to a lesser extent XCOR and Virgin Galactic, survive this incursion from a well-funded NewSpace Cousin?

(the youtube video via Clark Lindsey's youtube channel.)  

SpaceX has announced the company is developing the “Grasshopper,” a 100 foot-tall suborbital Falcon 9 first stage that SpaceX’s cadre of young, talented engineers will use to test this initial piece of the rF9.  SpaceX has NOT announced any intention to commercialize the Grasshopper.  But if Masten, XCOR, and Armadillo continue to delay bringing a product to market that can reach 100KM, and SpaceX continues to develop products in its typical rapid fashion, might customers ask to buy payload space on an upcoming Grasshopper test?  

Or would SpaceX be willing to sell Grasshoppers to operators who then provide a suborbital launch service to users using the Grasshopper all before Masten has reached 100KM?  Could the unmanned Grasshopper be modified to carry passengers and compete with Virgin and XCOR?  If an operator came with funding, wouldn’t SpaceX take their money to make the modifications to "manrate" Grasshopper?

But the big money is the orbital market.  Most of the suborbital companies have expressed interest in using their suborbital experience and even their suborbital vehicles to expand current offerings to include an orbital system.  XCOR has published this image of an orbital capability.  

Virgin Galactic even took investment money from the Middle East to jump start their orbital program.  Could an rF9 meet all market demand for both suborbital and ultimately orbital launches as well?  And if they do, are the current suborbital companies doomed? 

It all comes down to money.

How cheaply could SpaceX really launch their new rF9?  We don’t know.  SpaceX does not even know yet.  But we can make some interesting estimates.   The heart of these projected orbital price reductions stems from reusing the rF9 like Southwest reuses its 747’s (which can fly commercially for 30 years with proper maintenance).  How many reuses is SpaceX planning on? 

At this point, the best data I have is a nugget SpaceX's CEO, Elon Musk, said this last week that he is targeting $500K trips to Mars as a market for his reusable craft.  

Let’s make some assumptions so we can approximate SpaceX’s reusability assumptions:

1. A price for a Dragon/Falcon 9 trip to Mars will be equal to the price SpaceX is currently charging NASA for ISS visits ($130M per trip) - optimistic assumption
2. 5 paying passengers per Mars Trip - optimistic assumption
3. 10% profit per launch
4. All maintenance and between-flight costs are included in the launch price - optimistic assumption

SpaceX breaks even after 47 flights (but that is a lot of assumptions).  here is a table to help visualize the math:

 Assuming a 47-flight amortization, what could be SpaceX’s breakeven price per KG to LEO?  Or to say it another way, how low would the suborbital company’s prices have to be to beat SpaceX?  

Again, let’s make some assumptions:

1. A price for an rF9 to LEO is the same as current LEO Falcon 9
2. Falcon 9 payload to LEO is unchanged
3. 10% profit per launch
4. All maintenance and between flight costs are included in the launch price.
5. Propellant Cost per Launch = $200K
6. rF9 breaks even after 47 flights

Based on these assumptions, SpaceX's breakeven Price to LEO for rF9 is $130 per KG or ~$1.4M per flight.  Again, here is a table to summarize how I came to this conclusion.  At the end of this post is a link to an interactive spreadsheet where you can modify these assumptions to create your own analysis.

These SpaceX prices are surely the most optimistic for the near term:

1. What if the rF9 doesn’t get 47 flights per vehicle?
2. What if between-flight maintenance costs for the rF9 are significant?
3. What if payload capacity has to be significantly reduced to accommodate rF9’s reusability elements?
4. What if near term launch demand is not high enough to fly as often as they need?

Even with the identified risks, this analysis would indicate:

• Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for suborbital market share (especially if SpaceX sells the Grasshoppers to entrepreneur operators)
• Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for orbital market share through extraordinarily low prices

So how can XCOR and Masten compete?  

I continue to be bullish regarding the utility of Nanosat-class launch vehicles.  When suborbital companies start offering orbital services (a second generation service), their initial orbital offerings would probably be within this Nanosat class - broadly speaking, payload space significantly under 100kg.  Is there still a market for suborbital companies to offer this type of orbital service?  Even if SpaceX may be able to now match (or beat) them on price?  

Yes.  Here is why:

Sometimes smaller is better.  The smaller vehicles these suborbital companies will eventually offer on orbit should:

• Be easier to "fly full"– to get the $130/KG price on an rF9, you have to wait for the manifest to fill.  Not so with a smaller vehicle.  XCOR was talking about a payload of 12-20KG initially.
• Be easier (and cost less) to maintain.
• Be launched with less integration or preparation – this advantage is the BIG one.  XCOR talks about multiple flights on the same day, taking off and landing from existing airports.  Even if the rF9 could launch that often, it will be some time before regulations allow SpaceX to fly that often - especially if they are still flying from the Cape or Vandenberg where ops tempo is measured in "launches per month" not "launches per day".

Nanosat launchers are the future, but only if their ops tempo is fast enough to justify paying a premium for preferential launch windows.  

This advantage of the small won’t last forever.  SpaceX will keep improving its initial RLV offerings.  Spaceport operations will grow to allow for more airline-like ops tempos.  So Nanosat launch operators (today’s suborbital companies) will have to keep improving too.

But there is a market for Nanosats and it hinges now on ops tempo.  There is hope.

The bigger worry…

…is in the near term.  I mentioned earlier, I doubt SpaceX will pursue commercializing their Grasshopper suborbital vehicle.  But they may be open to selling this suborbital vehicle for others to operate.  Such a suborbital operator flying the Grasshopper would have tremendous suborbital market advantages and could be a major competitor to those suborbital companies focusing on suborbital research (Masten, Armadillo, etc.).

Suborbital companies should be worried, but not panicking.  If the reusable Falcon 9 hastens the development of viable Nanosat launchers, the industry will be doubly blessed – low launch costs from the rF9 and high ops tempo from Nanosat launchers.

Here is the interactive spreadsheet so you can build your own rF9 assumptions.

Designing RLVs with the Lowest Life-Cycle Cost

Designing RLVs with the Lowest Life-Cycle Cost

Sepatuads.com   Oktober 20, 2010   Comment  

This was the Space Shuttle we wanted:

The Shuttle parked in the hanger.  Integration for the next mission was supposed to be comparable to Southwest Airlines loading my luggage (maybe I exaggerate a little).  This is the Space Shuttle we got:

The Shuttle requires between 200,000 and 400,000 human maintenance hours between each flight! You can barely see the shuttle in the picture above because of the scaffolding surrounding and incasing the vehicle.

Shuttle experts can (and have) elaborated more eloquently than I could on the reasons why the Space Shuttle reusability goals fell so short. But as we prepare for suborbital RLV operations (and hopefully orbital operations) in the not so distant future, I wanted to discuss the implications of an interesting paper by SpaceWorks Engineering (Michael J. Kelly, et al) and its implications for the costs of RLV design & operations.

The paper is called, What’s Cheaper to Fly: Rocket or TBCC? Why?  In it, SpaceWorks compares two hypothetical RLV designs (one rocket-based and one turbine-based) and discusses the expected operational costs of both systems. Both designs made the following RLV performance assumptions:

• Fleet of three unmanned RLV vehicles
• Fleet flies monthly (12/yr)
• Every 10 flights, RLVs spend 6-mo in offsite heavy maintenance facility
• 100 nautical mile LEO orbit
• Payload 20K lb.

What I found interesting was what ratio the paper’s authors leveraged from the Space Shuttle program to include in their analysis.  The Shuttle utilizes seven support personnel for every one technician in their maintenance and integration efforts. For every one technician preparing the Space Shuttle for its next mission, there are seven individuals supporting that technician. This support staff consists of mission specialists, engineering support personnel, etc. Using this 7:1 ratio, the SpaceWorks paper estimated the need for RLV technicians and then extrapolated the number of support personnel needed.

Using the SpaceWorks rocket-based RLV as an example, below are the costs associated with preparing the rocket for its second flight:

Ignore the exact dollars but pay attention to the percentage. 91% of all “between flight” costs is labor using the 7:1 assumption. Stop worrying about fuel cost – start creating low-maintenance designs.  Of course there are other costs that go into the price of an RLV launch: range costs, fixed cost amortization, development cost amortization, etc. But you can see how critical life-cycle costs become in RLV design discussions.

Quoting the paper, “Any program that can do better than 7:1 will probably save significant money over a program that cannot.” And “In addition to considering operational impacts when selecting engines and TPS materials, vehicle designers should strive to eliminate the need for centralized hydraulics, and for auxiliary power units.”

For example, here is what maintenance and integration costs could look like at various improvements to the Shuttle’s 7:1 support personnel to technicians ratio (all other assumptions unchanged):

I end this post with a quote from Byron Ellis, Executive Director of the Jethro Project, on life-cycle cost and Government Acquisition (just as applicable for RLV designers as Government acquisition agents):

“Executive Order 13123 requires government agencies to use life cycle cost analysis (LCCA) to minimize the government’s cost of ownership. Unfortunately, many stakeholders do not understand the concept of cost and proceed to minimize project acquisition (first) cost, rather than total project cost. However, over the life of the project, facility management cost is often two to three times higher than acquisition costs. Therefore, it is essential to design for minimum facility management cost.”