Would a Reusable Falcon Hurt SpaceX?

Would a Reusable Falcon Hurt SpaceX?

Sepatuads.com   September 07, 2012   Comment  

What happens if SpaceX is successful at achieving its Falcon reusability goals.  Here is the video of SpaceX’s plans to recover and reuse the majority of its Falcon launch system.

Let me make some assumptions about a Reusable Falcon (R-Falcon) to make my point that such a system may pose challenges for SpaceX.

On the surface, an R-Falcon would be great.  If my assumptions below are accurate, only $16M per flight, a flight every 30 days, only two thousand dollars per KG.  From a consumer perspective this would be great!  SpaceX is adding reusability to the large rockets they already have.  And they will probably be successful at it.  They do seem to achieve what they put their mind to, however, could there be an easier road to reusability?  Let’s explore the possibility.  First what could a large reusable system like SpaceX’s look like (dollars values in millions)?

  

I am still amazed we can’t build Saturn V’s today.  We built them before.  We went to the moon in them for goodness sake!  We knew how to build them…why don’t we know now?  Two major reasons:

1. We don’t have the tooling/plans – long since destroyed or lost
2. We don’t have the knowledge – the NASA/contractor engineers have retired/passed away

 Surely such a reusable system like the R-Falcon could avoid these Saturn-V pitfalls…right?  If you look at the table above you see I estimated SpaceX builds eight initial R-Falcons.  This high number addresses the unknowns about number of flights per R-Falcons.  Will it really be 10 flights per vehicle as I estimate?  And how long will it take technicians to refurbish and integrate the next payload? 6 weeks?  8 weeks?  With flights every month and 6-8 week refurbish and integration windows, multiple R-Falcons will be needed.

So here is the problem.

After the initial push to develop the R-Falcon fleet, at the usage rates outlined in the table, you would NOT NEED TO BUILD another R-Falcon for 6.5 years!

So SpaceX could avoid throwing away their tooling (unlike the Saturn V), but could they keep a knowledgeable team around ready to build the next R-Falcon 6.5 years after the first fleet was completed?

And even if you believe eight R-Falcons in the initial fleet is too many and want to reduce the fleet size, demand rates of one per month means SpaceX would only need to make approximately one R-Falcon per year to keep up with demand.  Not exactly mass production – 1 vehicle per year.  Can you keep the production team “sharp” on 1 vehicle per year?

How can it be, as a consumer, I love the R-Falcon (yay $2k per KG), but as a business, could the R-Falcon be a bad way to prove a reusable launch vehicle?  Could the R-Falcon launch too much payload and launch too infrequently?

Let’s talk about an alternate business approach that could address some of these challenges.  I said above that my hypothetical R-Falcon has two problems:

•  Launching too much payload
• Launching too infrequently

How could a new hypothetical company do reusable launch better?  What if you launch less mass but launch more often?  So let’s make up a hypothetical launch system – the “Kinglet.”  Since this is a business blog, let’s not get bogged down into the technical details except that instead of launching 7,000KG per flight, the Kinglet will launch 100KG.  And instead of paying the R-Falcon’s $5M for range access per flight, the Kinglet pays $200K per flight for its range or range-like services (airport, spaceport, other?).  Here is the table for such a system (dollars values in millions).

The Kinglet is a smaller launch system but aims for a higher flight rate, targeting weekly flights instead the R-Falcon’s monthly flight rate.  As a potential customer, I do not like the 10x higher price I pay to use Kinglet ($20K per KG vice the Falcon’s $2K).  But flying weekly may be attractive to some customers.  Overall though, this appears to be bad for customers (most customers could wait a month to fly).  But from a business perspective, all things being equal, a small reusable launch system like Kinglet has a much higher probability of success because it starts small.

Where the Falcon struggled to keep its production line open with only one new vehicle per year, the Kinglet will need to produce five systems per year to keep up with demand.  Now five launch vehicles per year is still not mass production, but those volumes will, not only keep the production team sharp, but provide five times the opportunities to roll in product and production improvements into the newer vehicles than would be possible on the R-Falcon production line.

Could a smaller reusable system avoid R-Falcon's hidden pitfalls?  Maybe.

So the last question to ask is, what needs to be launched at least weekly with a mass of under 100KG? 

Here is the excel file with tables from this post if you want to change the assumptions.

Will the Reusable Falcon 9 Kill the Suborbital Launch Industry?

Will the Reusable Falcon 9 Kill the Suborbital Launch Industry?

Sepatuads.com   Oktober 01, 2011   Comment  

With SpaceX’s announcement this week that the company would not only develop a reusable first stage for its Falcon 9 family of rockets but would make a completely reusable rocket system (I will use Clark Lindsey’s nomenclature: "rF9" for reusable Falcon 9), I have been wondering about the future of the young NewSpace companies developing reusable suborbital rockets.  Will companies like Masten, Armadillo and to a lesser extent XCOR and Virgin Galactic, survive this incursion from a well-funded NewSpace Cousin?

(the youtube video via Clark Lindsey's youtube channel.)  

SpaceX has announced the company is developing the “Grasshopper,” a 100 foot-tall suborbital Falcon 9 first stage that SpaceX’s cadre of young, talented engineers will use to test this initial piece of the rF9.  SpaceX has NOT announced any intention to commercialize the Grasshopper.  But if Masten, XCOR, and Armadillo continue to delay bringing a product to market that can reach 100KM, and SpaceX continues to develop products in its typical rapid fashion, might customers ask to buy payload space on an upcoming Grasshopper test?  

Or would SpaceX be willing to sell Grasshoppers to operators who then provide a suborbital launch service to users using the Grasshopper all before Masten has reached 100KM?  Could the unmanned Grasshopper be modified to carry passengers and compete with Virgin and XCOR?  If an operator came with funding, wouldn’t SpaceX take their money to make the modifications to "manrate" Grasshopper?

But the big money is the orbital market.  Most of the suborbital companies have expressed interest in using their suborbital experience and even their suborbital vehicles to expand current offerings to include an orbital system.  XCOR has published this image of an orbital capability.  

Virgin Galactic even took investment money from the Middle East to jump start their orbital program.  Could an rF9 meet all market demand for both suborbital and ultimately orbital launches as well?  And if they do, are the current suborbital companies doomed? 

It all comes down to money.

How cheaply could SpaceX really launch their new rF9?  We don’t know.  SpaceX does not even know yet.  But we can make some interesting estimates.   The heart of these projected orbital price reductions stems from reusing the rF9 like Southwest reuses its 747’s (which can fly commercially for 30 years with proper maintenance).  How many reuses is SpaceX planning on? 

At this point, the best data I have is a nugget SpaceX's CEO, Elon Musk, said this last week that he is targeting $500K trips to Mars as a market for his reusable craft.  

Let’s make some assumptions so we can approximate SpaceX’s reusability assumptions:

1. A price for a Dragon/Falcon 9 trip to Mars will be equal to the price SpaceX is currently charging NASA for ISS visits ($130M per trip) - optimistic assumption
2. 5 paying passengers per Mars Trip - optimistic assumption
3. 10% profit per launch
4. All maintenance and between-flight costs are included in the launch price - optimistic assumption

SpaceX breaks even after 47 flights (but that is a lot of assumptions).  here is a table to help visualize the math:

 Assuming a 47-flight amortization, what could be SpaceX’s breakeven price per KG to LEO?  Or to say it another way, how low would the suborbital company’s prices have to be to beat SpaceX?  

Again, let’s make some assumptions:

1. A price for an rF9 to LEO is the same as current LEO Falcon 9
2. Falcon 9 payload to LEO is unchanged
3. 10% profit per launch
4. All maintenance and between flight costs are included in the launch price.
5. Propellant Cost per Launch = $200K
6. rF9 breaks even after 47 flights

Based on these assumptions, SpaceX's breakeven Price to LEO for rF9 is $130 per KG or ~$1.4M per flight.  Again, here is a table to summarize how I came to this conclusion.  At the end of this post is a link to an interactive spreadsheet where you can modify these assumptions to create your own analysis.

These SpaceX prices are surely the most optimistic for the near term:

1. What if the rF9 doesn’t get 47 flights per vehicle?
2. What if between-flight maintenance costs for the rF9 are significant?
3. What if payload capacity has to be significantly reduced to accommodate rF9’s reusability elements?
4. What if near term launch demand is not high enough to fly as often as they need?

Even with the identified risks, this analysis would indicate:

• Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for suborbital market share (especially if SpaceX sells the Grasshoppers to entrepreneur operators)
• Yes, rF9 could compete against suborbital companies for orbital market share through extraordinarily low prices

So how can XCOR and Masten compete?  

I continue to be bullish regarding the utility of Nanosat-class launch vehicles.  When suborbital companies start offering orbital services (a second generation service), their initial orbital offerings would probably be within this Nanosat class - broadly speaking, payload space significantly under 100kg.  Is there still a market for suborbital companies to offer this type of orbital service?  Even if SpaceX may be able to now match (or beat) them on price?  

Yes.  Here is why:

Sometimes smaller is better.  The smaller vehicles these suborbital companies will eventually offer on orbit should:

• Be easier to "fly full"– to get the $130/KG price on an rF9, you have to wait for the manifest to fill.  Not so with a smaller vehicle.  XCOR was talking about a payload of 12-20KG initially.
• Be easier (and cost less) to maintain.
• Be launched with less integration or preparation – this advantage is the BIG one.  XCOR talks about multiple flights on the same day, taking off and landing from existing airports.  Even if the rF9 could launch that often, it will be some time before regulations allow SpaceX to fly that often - especially if they are still flying from the Cape or Vandenberg where ops tempo is measured in "launches per month" not "launches per day".

Nanosat launchers are the future, but only if their ops tempo is fast enough to justify paying a premium for preferential launch windows.  

This advantage of the small won’t last forever.  SpaceX will keep improving its initial RLV offerings.  Spaceport operations will grow to allow for more airline-like ops tempos.  So Nanosat launch operators (today’s suborbital companies) will have to keep improving too.

But there is a market for Nanosats and it hinges now on ops tempo.  There is hope.

The bigger worry…

…is in the near term.  I mentioned earlier, I doubt SpaceX will pursue commercializing their Grasshopper suborbital vehicle.  But they may be open to selling this suborbital vehicle for others to operate.  Such a suborbital operator flying the Grasshopper would have tremendous suborbital market advantages and could be a major competitor to those suborbital companies focusing on suborbital research (Masten, Armadillo, etc.).

Suborbital companies should be worried, but not panicking.  If the reusable Falcon 9 hastens the development of viable Nanosat launchers, the industry will be doubly blessed – low launch costs from the rF9 and high ops tempo from Nanosat launchers.

Here is the interactive spreadsheet so you can build your own rF9 assumptions.

Commercial Asteroid Return to Station

Commercial Asteroid Return to Station

Sepatuads.com   Juni 22, 2011   Comment  

Back in 2010, Michael Mealing began to consider a spacecraft mission to capture and return a very small Near Earth Object (NEO) to the ISS or Bigelow module for study. He writes about business concept here. Michael’s point, humanity will only travel into the solar system if they can make money at each step. NEOs may be the next step after LEO.

Then in January, 2011, the topic of a NEO capture and return to LEO comes up again in the comment discussions on the Space Business Blog here. So Michael and I have teamed up to continue refining this business concept.

Here’s a Pencast describing the basic concept for a mission to return a small asteroid sample to a space station in LEO.  I also include a few markets that might make such a mission profitable.

NEO Return to Station

brought to you by Livescribe

Moon dust legally for sale - $50K for a few small specs. 

Next, I will walk you through the spreadsheet model built to analyze what would be required for a mission like the one described in the Pencast above.

Assumptions:

1. Spacecraft launched to LEO Space station to standby until target asteroid has been identified.
2. Spacecraft launched from LEO space station and returning to LEO space station.
3. Haul all propellant for round trip (no refueling).
4. A duplicate amount of Delta-V will be required for both the trip out to the asteroid and the trip from the asteroid back to a LEO space station (assuming NO aerobraking to avoid damaging asteroid). Note: The mission’s costs could be greatly reduced if one could determine a smart engineering method to reduce the needed delta-v for the return trip to a LEO space station.
5. Mass of dry spacecraft: 200Kg (Similar to NEAP but swap out all of NEAP's science gear for some type of grappling mechanism).
6. Engine efficiency Isp = 342 seconds.
7. Although spacecraft is docked to LEO space station before mission start, this model assumes no propellant boil-off or LOX top-off prior to mission start. 
8. Since the target NEO is still undetermined, multiple Delta-V’s were modeled to reach NEO targets. Delta-V’s between 5500, 4500, 3500, and 2500 m/s were considered.
9. Asteroid 2010 RF12 has a radius of 3.5m and a mass of 500,000kg according to NASA. Prorating these values to a radius of 0.5m gives you a sphere slightly smaller than the desired “refrigerator” in Michael Mealing’s earlier posts with a mass of 71,429Kg. This mass is larger than what I wanted to consider for a proof of concept mission, so although I include the 71K Kg mass in the analysis, I focus on target asteroid masses of 500, 300, 100, 50, 25, and 10Kg.

Conclusions:
The table below is the summary of my analysis. The columns in the table below represent the multiple delta-v’s modeled for our 200Kg spacecraft to travel from a LEO space station and AR&D with the target NEO. The rows are the various NEO masses that were considered (or – how big of a rock the mission can go out and get). The data populated (the cells with numbers) are the total mission masses for each combination of delta-v and NEO mass. The total mission mass includes all propellant needed not only to reach the NEO but to return it to LEO as well. The color coding correlates to the launch vehicle table below – Dnepr in green, Falcon 9 in orange, and Falcon Heavy in purple.

A few Observations:

• Finding low delta-v targets will dramatically increase the size of the asteroid one could successfully return. For example, instead of a 10Kg target at 5,000m/s of delta-v, the same spacecraft could return a 500Kg target if only 2500m/s of delta-v were needed to reach it (and at almost half the total mission mass!) – that is a lot more rock for scientists to analyze – 500kg instead of 10kg.
• Are there ways to decrease the delta-v required to reach these targets or return from them (currently avoiding aerobraking, but maybe a small asteroid could be shielded during aerobraking)?
• Because such small NEO objects will be difficult to spot a head of time (there are many more NEOs than we have on record - especially small ones), such a mission has to be very patient waiting on station many months/years for the “perfect” NEO to approach with the right blend of low delta-v and a mass that is “just right”. And to respond to new targets, the mission must be ready to depart the station on very short notice in pursuit of any newly identified targets.
• Growing humanity’s knowledge of very small NEOs increases the chances of mission success.

Here is an example of the tables I built to analyze propellant needs. Here are the tables feeding the 5500 m/s of delta-v column. The colored cell in each table varies the asteroid masses. Here is the interactive spreadsheet for those that want to modify my assumptions and want to view the tables for the delta-V's modeled as well.

Delta-V 5500m/s:

Next steps:
Michael and I plan to refine this concept over the coming months. Look for follow-up posts here on SBB and over on Michael’s blog.

Business Case for a CubeSat-based Earth Imaging Constellation

Business Case for a CubeSat-based Earth Imaging Constellation

Sepatuads.com   Mei 31, 2011   Comment  

The use of Commercial Earth Imaging Satellites is growing. Individuals, corporations and governments are finding varied and unique applications for images of our planet.

Futron estimates the market for commercial earth imaging topped $1B last year (2010).


Uses of Earth Imaging:

• Disaster Relief – think of all of the satellite images you saw after the Japan Earthquake (including the nuclear reactors)
• Disaster avoidance - George Clooney (among others) paying to patrol boarder of north and south Sudan using Earth imaging satellites.
• Helped with hunting down Osama bin Laden (but were any these images from commercial satellites?)
• Food Commodities tracking – allowing traders to ask and answer questions like, “how do the wheat crops in Kansas look after last night’s hail storm?”
• Remote Infrastructure observation – the oil industry uses it to keep track of their assets in remote locations
• Even the US Government is turning to Commercial providers. Last year, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) awarded separate 10-year, $3.5 Billion contracts to image providers DigitalGlobe and GeoEye (these contracts are now under review).

The Commercial earth observation markets:

1. Market #1: High-Resolution images (1.5 meters per pixel). But the cost of each satellite means providers have a limited number of satellites (usually 1-2) on orbit.
2. Market #2: Med-Resolution images (5-7 meters per pixel) – lower quality images, but providers tend to have more satellites in orbit and may offer more spectral bands to choose from for each image and offer more frequent photo opportunities due to the higher number of satellites within the constellation.

In a recent Nov 2010 paper, “6U CubeSat design for Earth observation with 6.5m GSD, five spectral bands and 14Mbps downlink,” author, Dr. Steven Tsitas outlines how a constellation of 6U CubeSats could serve Market #2 (frequent med-res images) competitively. (Sorry, I think you will have to buy the paper. If a reader finds a free version of the paper online, let me know and I will change the link). I hope to post an interview with Steven Tsitas soon.

But why even consider a CubeSat at all for such a mission? Here are just a few of the advantageous of using CubeSats:

• High amount of innovation in the field – from NASA, universities, and private industry
• Low ITAR restrictions (CubeSat programs are thriving in many nations)
• Low mass of each satellite
• Reduced launch cost per satellite
• Reduced cost to replace/upgrade constellation as satellites age, breakdown, or new technology becomes available

Rapid Eye, a German company, is the current leader serving Market #2. Below I will provide some details about Rapid Eye and how a CubeSat constellation might be able to compete with Rapid Eye.  First, a little education about Rapid Eye.

Rapid Eye Details:

• Five identical sun-synchronous Earth observation satellites
• Five spectral bands
• Launched in August 2008
• Satellites built by Surrey UK
• 650KM circular orbit
• Captures 4mil km squared of earth’s surface every day
• Once an order is placed for an image, can take a photo of any location on earth (between 75 degrees N and 75 degrees S) within 24 hours.
• Offers not only images, but offers services for the analysis of images – especially good at providing comparative analysis of images taken over a period of time

Rapid Eye, the Numbers:

• Customer price for images: $1.33 per square KM (must purchase 5,000 KM at a time (at current Euro conversation rates that is equal to $6650 per very large image)
• Satellite Constellation construction: $35M 
• Expected 2009 Revenue: $29.5M (have not confirmed this number)
• Total Capital needed to break even: $224M

Assumptions about Rapid Eye’s business:

• Assumed Rapid Eye is now profitable
• Assumed the cost of the single Dnepr launch necessary to lift the five Rapid Eye sats: $15M
• Assumed a $50M infrastructure Hardware purchase (ground station and other startup infrastructure)
• Assumed a five year startup at a cost of ~$25M per year in operating (non-HW, non-infrastructure costs)

So what if we could launch a constellation of ten cubesats that could perform a very similar function as Rapid Eye’s current constellation of five small sats? Are their savings if we could? For this post, I will use Steven Tsitas’s conclusions that, yes, such a cubesat constellation would be technically possible.

I will build my business case, not from a technology discussion, but by attempting to answer the business question of - how much could an business save by using Cubesats instead of small sats?

CubeSat Venture Assumptions:

• Cost per 6U CubeSat: $400,000
• Number of CubeSats in constellation: 10
• 6U CubeSat mass: 8 lbs each
• Falcon 1 launch: $9.8M
• SpaceX willing to prorate launch cost based on mass

If we assume the CubeSat venture would operate using the same Hardware and Operating Costs as the Rapid Eye venture, then the CubeSat savings are limited to the cost of the satellites themselves and the cost to launch them into orbit:

• Rapid Eye’s satellite and launch costs: 23% of breakeven costs
• CubeSat venture’s satellite and launch costs: 3% of breakeven costs

This would mean a CubeSat venture competing with Rapid Eye could theoretically lower image prices by twenty percentage points over competitors (all other things being equal). This by itself may close the business case for some CubeSat constellation investors.

But perhaps competing toe-to-toe with Rapid Eye is the wrong business model. As a general rule, it is hard to out Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart. What-if the CubeSat earth imaging venture could, instead, become the low-price, no frills, earth imaging provider?

In the earlier example, the CubeSat advantage was limited to lower satellite costs and cheaper rides to orbit on SpaceX launch vehicles. But what-if the venture could also save money on ground costs: Hardware/ground stations and operating expenses?

CubeSats, the low-cost leader in earth imaging Assumptions:

• Continue with assumptions regarding low satellite costs
• Continue with assumptions regarding low launch costs
• Lower ground Hardware and Infrastructure costs from $50M to $25M
• Lower operating costs from $25M to $10M per year.

Here is a quick cost comparison between the options:


















Next Questions (beyond the scope of this post):

• Market price elasticity: How price sensitive is the earth imaging market? How would cutting Rapid Eye’s price by 20-60% affect demand for a CubeSat-based image product?
• What realistic cost reduction methods are possible in ground hardware and personnel?
• Admittedly, my Rapid Eye information was limited to publicly available data, a more serious effort should be conducted to understand the competitor’s cost structures and current profit forecasts
• What are the cost implications from using a CubeSat-based system? Where are system costs reduced? Where are system costs increased?
• Admittedly, images from a CubeSat are of a lower quality than the best in orbit (5-7 meters per pixel compared to 1.5 meters per pixel from the industry leaders of market #1).  How sensitive is the market to image quality?  And what can be done to increase the quality of an image taken on a 6U CubeSat?

NASA's Commercial Crew/Cargo Market Assessment

NASA's Commercial Crew/Cargo Market Assessment

Sepatuads.com   Mei 16, 2011   Comment  

NASA has released a 40-page Commercial Crew/Cargo Market Assessment for Low Earth Orbit.  RLV News pointed me to the softcopy – thanks Clark.

Here is NASA’s summary of the next ten years of projected commercial demand for cargo and crew to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) with commercial demand ranging from 7K-60K lbs of cargo and from 44 to 360 commercial astronauts.

Here are the Nuggets from NASA's assessment I found especially valuable:

• Crew Transportation drives the overall market.
• 4 Commercial Crew/Cargo Markets: (1) Countries lacking Space Programs, (2) Space Tourism, (3) Applied Research, (4) Other Markets – Satellite Servicing, Media, Education
• Report looked at a ten year time horizon
• Report excluded NASA Crew/Cargo usage - commercial usage only
• The average ISS crew member uses 10.3 lb/cargo per day (based on historical NASA/Russian usage)
• 4 Space Tourism Growth Constraints: (1) Crew Transport Availability, (2) Cost per customer, (3) lack of destinations besides ISS, (4) long training time
• ISS’s Upmass Requirements 2011-2020 = 318K lbs: (1) Core Systems/Operations = 194,820 lbs, (2) Funded Research = 80,067 lbs, (3) National Lab Utilization (unfunded) = 43,266 lbs
• Current ISS limitations as a research platform: (1) Inadequate HW/instruments to support research, (2) lack of frequent and affordable up/downmass to/from ISS
• Report concludes that availability of up and downmass is “a major constraint to development of the market” and quotes the National Research Council as saying, “conditioned down mass of particular importance…”
• Current research on ISS: Basic Research. Over next ten years, ISS research will gradually shift to governments paying for proof of concepts and private ventures pursuing commercialization of successful proof of concepts.
• NASA is on contract to purchase 132K lbs of ISS cargo through 2015. According to the authors, NASA ISS cargo demand from 2016-2020 is currently flat for another 132K lbs
• 4 Classes of Research conducted on ISS: (1) Biology/Biotech – 70% of ISS research to date, (2) Earth Observation, (3) Physical/Material Sciences, (4) Technology Development/Space Qualifying
• United States does 36% of the research on ISS
• But only 9% of all research on ISS to date is “Commercial” in nature – and even this “commercial” research to date has been subsidized by non-commercial sources.

Comments:

• Although not presenting very much new data, the authors confirmed and consolidated a significant amount of commercial market data into one place
• The authors relied heavily on industry values to determine the upper end of these markets.
• The authors never exceeded industry's optimism.  The authors in every case established low end demand by extrapolating from history.
• Although mentioning the critical importance of downmass to station research, the authors did not provide a downmass demand estimate for the next decade
• I look forward to the day when commercial research on orbiting stations far exceeds the current 9%!
• Overall, a very helpful report (if, perhaps conservative) that will stay on my shelf as a reference.

NLV Market Analysis

NLV Market Analysis

Sepatuads.com   Maret 06, 2011   Comment  

Garvey's Prospector 7C

In October of 2004, I attended the Space Frontier Foundation’s conference in Southern California on the Queen Mary. There, Masten Space Systems made a big splash announcing it was joining Armadillo Aerospace in developing Suborbital RLV’s.

I remember thinking at the time, how did Masten have enough market data to make that decision? Masten, Armadillo, XCOR, Virgin, Blue Origin – these guys & gals threw their hat in the ring long before there were significant studies confirming suborbital RLV’s made “market sense”. They had vision. They had guts. Or if the data did exist, at the time, I did not know how to find it.

And now, NASA is offering a prize for a Nano-satellite Launch Vehicle (NLV) – “launching very small things quite often”. And as candidate NLV teams consider throwing their hats in this ring, the market data is a little more available for an NLV service than there was for suborbital service almost a decade ago.

This post attempts to consolidate that NLV market analysis. Of course this will be incomplete, so I need your help. Add links to other NLV market data in the comments of this post to benefit the whole group. I will skip a discussion of NASA's NLV Challenge.  Here is NASA's NLV Challenge Page  for more details. 
I have broken the NLV market analysis down into the following categories:

• NLV Market Sources
• Market Overview
• NLV Market Differentiators 
• NLV Substitutes
• Interesting NLV Market Nuggets
• Potential Market Competitors
• Market Demand Graph
• NLV Pricing Discussion
• Market Impactors

NLV Market Sources.  The authors of these study deserve your business. Buy their papers. They are doing good work. Instead of at the end of this post, I wanted these links near the top!

• Foust, J. 2010. “Emerging Opportunities for Low-Cost Small Satellites in Civil and Commercial Space”
• Foust, J. 2008. “If you Build It, Who will Come? Identifying Markets for Low-Cost Small Satellites”
• Christensen, I, et al. 2010. “Market Characterization: Launch of Very-Small and Nano Sized Payloads Enabled By New Launch Vehicles.” This link will give you the first few pages, have to buy the full version.

Market Overview.  The NLV market can be dissected in at least two ways: (1) by payload size and (2) by payload type.

Payload Size. I have heard various naming conventions for small payload launch vehicles.  For this blog post, I will use “Nano”, “Micro”, “Small” as three payload sizes to consider.  However, I will group them all together and use the name NLV most of the time.

• Nano - Under 10kg
• Micro - 10-100 kg
• Small - 100-200 kg

NASA is focused on a 1kg payload for its NLV Challenge. The Army is interested in at least 20kg payloads. Even if first generation vehicles are only able to launch a few kg of payload, commercial NLV ventures would be wise to endeavor to grow to larger payload sizes over time. Current 200-400kg payloads launched currently on larger vehicles would surely be interested in "going on a diet" if an NLV launcher could carry 100-200Kg yet offer more frequent launches.

Payload Type. The second NLV market subdivision will be the option of (1) launching a functioning satellite or (2) delivering cargo to stations or depots. Of the two, cargo delivery may very well be the larger of the two sub-markets. It will take far less preparation to send the ISS an NLV-load of fresh apples than it would be to fund, develop, integrate, and launch a nanosat. Both satellite launches and cargo delivery will be sub-markets. Expect the satellite market to retain a diversified customer base. Expect the cargo delivery customer base to be dominated by station owners in the early days (ISS partners and Bigelow), but to expand to Space Station customers in the not so distant future (see: NanoRacks).

NLV Market Differentiators.  What makes an NLV unique? An NLV won’t be able to carry as much payload to orbit as its bigger cousins, why would any customers want to use an NLV?  Answer: Frequent launches, low integration time.

• Cost: Higher Cost per LB than larger launchers but lower Cost per launch
• Launch Frequency: Launch *much* more frequently than larger launchers (weekly? Daily?)
• Launch Lead Time: Integrate payloads in less time to take advantage of more frequent launches
• Payload Mass: a few kg (at first)
• Orbit Choice: Customers can choose since not a secondary payload
• Suborbit/LEO/GEO: Limited to LEO (at first) – Suborbital applications? Maybe.

NLV Substitutes.  Prices for NLV’s cannot be set independent of substitutes. Here’s a list of some big ones:

• Launch as secondary payload. Spaceflight Services (Andrews Space) offers a turnkey solution for your payload to fly on the BIG rockets as a secondary payload.
• Hosted payloads. Boeing just launched a new service to combine your payload with others on a single satellite bus thus reducing customer costs since they do not need to procure an entire satellite. Note: this would be a substitute only for satellite payloads, not for cargo payloads
• Commercial RLV suborbital spaceflight. Masten, Armadillo, and Blue Origin are stuck at 100km for now, but not for long. Watch as future generations of their vehicles climb higher and higher giving customers a greater flight-time, frequent launches, and very low costs.
• With COTS deliveries to ISS approaching, deliveries to station will be made by NASA several times per year with ISS partners also delivering cargo to station several times per year.

Interesting NLV Market Nuggets.

• Microcosm Inc, identified potential market-wide launch savings of more than $15B over a 12-year period, resulting from the development of a low-cost responsive launch vehicle focused on the SmallSat market (above 100Kg)
• In a 2008 presentation, Pete Worden said there were ~80 universities with active cubesat (nanosat) programs 
• A 2006 Futron Study identified over 30 markets in 6 principle areas for services provided by low-cost satellites in the 100-200 kilogram class
• The US Army is interested in Nano Launch and had put a price point of $1M per launch.
• My interview with the CEO of CubeSat component manufacturer Clyde Space revealed he thought $250K for a 3u is definitely too much for most customers.
• My interview with Professor Jordi Puig-Suari from Cal Poly and professors from MIT, and St. Louis University who are currently active in either university satellite development or active in space research of some kind show they are targeting a price point under $50K per CubeSat with $20K being preferred. Relooking at my notes from those interviews, at a $20K price point, these professors thought the US demand for CubeSat launches would grow to 50-100 each year. Interesting they thought the low flight opps of the current “secondary payload” system a bigger problem than the high cost. Prof Michael Swartwout said in my interview with him, he waits 5-7 years to secure a spot on a rocket to launch his CubeSats. This is longer than an undergrads college career – not too inspiring for young engineers!

Potential Market Competitors.  Non-exhaustive – From the Paper: "Market Characterization: Launch of Very-Small and Nano Sized Payloads" by Christsensen, et all. 2010.

Market Demand Graph:

This graph is incomplete but should convey the significant number of different areas where an NLV could gain market share. For an explanation of these categories I would encourage you to get a copy of the wonderful papers I list under the “sources” section of this post.

NLV Pricing Discussion.  A major portion of any market analysis is not just what the needs are but what are potential customers willing to pay to meet those needs. For the NLV market you have customers at different ends of a spectrum. Government customers like the Army have stated a willingness to pay $1M to place 20kg in LEO. Universities want to keep Cubesat costs (usually 1-3 kg) to under $20K per U.

Variable Pricing seems like the right answer, where Primary customers pay a premium to fly on their schedule to their orbit and others willing to fly “standby” get a much reduced price but operate on someone else’s schedule and flies to someone else’s orbit. Rather than rewrite the variable pricing details now, here is the post I wrote on variable NLV pricing a few months ago.

If you made me guess right now, I would assume the following prices per U would be acceptable by the market:

• Government: $50-200K per U (with discounts per U for larger payloads)
• Academia: $20K per U
• Commercial: ???, perhaps somewhere between

Market Impactors.  Any market has externalities to the market that can help or hurt the industry. Here are just a few:

• Of all of the substitutes available to the NLV market, the one that has most potential to steal market share is the second or third generation of suborbital RLV’s. As mentioned earlier in this post, a subset of the NLV market could be served with the extended micro-gravity offered by suborbital RLV’s flying to 500 or 1000 km. But the opposite is also true, a delay or accident affecting the un-manned portion of the suborbital RLV industry (primarily Masten, Armadillo, and Blue Origin) could make some customers consider launching on an NLV rather than waiting for the suborbital ride. 
• One of the two key sub-markets for NLV’s will be package delivery. More successful space stations, more package delivery. The proliferation of commercial space stations will be a major driver of this sub-market
• How the last mile problem gets solved will directly affect the viability of micro package delivery (one of my two submarkets). We need solutions for the last mile problem – the solution will be part technology, part policy, part management. If NLV packages can’t be routinely delivered to space stations, the NLV industry will be severely hampered and space stations will miss out on an enabling method to gain just-in-time deliveries.
• NLV’s only work as a market if they can launch frequently with low integration turnarounds. Even if low costs had to come later, the ability to launch frequently with streamlined payload integration will be the driving force behind early NLV success stories. The question operators will need to ask is, “How do I design and manage NLV operations in such a way to achieve the goals of frequent flight opps and low integration turnarounds?”
• Although depot development is still years down the road, the potential “match made in heaven” between depots need for frequent propellant deliveries and NLV’s ability to fly frequently should not be overlooked…but I would not build a business plan around depot assumptions just yet.

That is a good dataset to start.  I will add some commentary in future posts.  Here is the spreadsheet containing the tables used in this post. 

Now I welcome your additions.  Use the comments section to your links to even more NLV market data.

New Space Solutions to the Military's Wargame Problems

New Space Solutions to the Military's Wargame Problems

Sepatuads.com   Februari 20, 2011   Comment  

A ClydeSpace CubeSat

The Feb-11 issue of the Air Force Magazine discusses a recent wargame conducted at Schriever AFB. The US Military has problems defending space. This wargame highlighted that. I see two specific opportunities for New Space to help solve the US military’s problem .

First a summary of the 2010 Schriever Cyber and Space wargame.

• The Year is 2022.
• A small US ally takes a “local action”, to which a US “peer” rival take offense (they went out of their way not to say “China”, instead “peer rival”, but I am going to say China so this post has a more conversational tone. To my friends in China, please do not take offense).
• China retaliates by knocking out the US ally’s cyber and space capabilities
• The US assists its ally in attempting to restore these cyber and space capabilities
• China views these US actions as hostile and preemptively hits US cyber and satellite “enabler” capabilities. By denying these “enablers” the other US military branches are severely hampered (you try to fight a war without a web-enabled computer, GPS, or other satellite communications.)

Schriever Wargame Observations:

• Cold-War Deterrence theories are ill-suited these new domains (cyber and space)
• Cyber war and Space war is instantly global – there is no easy way to keep these conflicts regional.
• US has many peer rivals when it comes to offensive/defensive cyber and space capabilities. The US lacks the domain advantages it enjoys with ground, air, and sea capabilities 
• The US had a difficulty reconstituting space capabilities once those systems had been targeted (lack of ORS)
• Attacks on Cyber and Space systems created a very thick “fog of war” with no clear alternative methods of gaining information
• If our enemies removed our cyber and space capabilities our first action would be to seriously consider removing theirs (the advantage of these systems is so large)
• Because they are enablers, attacking Cyber and Space were the first targets chosen by the enemy
• Space Situational Awareness was significantly lacking.

Military Takeaways?

• Military Takeaway #1: Create Joint-Sats. Group the capabilities of many nations/companies on a single satellite – this way an attacker would have to “ponder the fallout of collateral damage” prior to attacking a space asset. This idea may have some merit, but feels more like the military is hiding behind other nations and corporations. If the military was already worried about such cyber/space conflicts turning “global”, such joint ownership of future satellites will only exacerbate the problem of turning such conflicts into “global” ones.
• Military Takeaway #2: Enhance space situational awareness: develop a CSpOC – a Combined Space Operations Center to integrate the space data coming in from Government, Commercial, and foreign ally sources. I like this idea. This shows the military’s willingness to admit they will need the help of civilian and foreign sources to defend the cyber and space realms. However, can’t the JSpOC do this? I don’t know enough about the JSpOC, but since they already do so much space asset tracking, expanding the JSpOC’s capabilities may make more sense than adding a new group. But again, I fully admit I don’t know enough about this to recommend one way or another.

So how can New Space Help?

I will focus my comments now to the space domain. I see two major product/services that New Space could offer in the near term to help the military avoid the hypothetical results of the 2022 Schriever wargame.

(1) NanoSat Launch Vehicles would offer the US the ability to quickly launch new satellites (100kg) to replace assets that are damaged or temporarily offline. The military’s wargame conclusions that by bundling satellite capabilities from several countries would deter an enemy, puts significant trust in your enemy not to come over the high wall you setup. But what if the enemy does escalate, what if they do attack those “joint-sats”? Such a policy does not solve the problem of a determined enemy. Being able to launch new satellites at will is perhaps the best defense to any anti-satellite weapon. I’m not the first to advocate this. I was just surprised by how little this solution was mentioned as a remedy for the US military’s poor performance in the wargame. I believe such an NLV is within the capabilities of new space (NASA’s NLV Challenge starts soon). If the NLV could launch on very short notice, there is no doubt in my mind that the military would be an eager customer.

(2) OBSERVER CubeSat: Perhaps the best deterrence from a space attack is Space Situational Awareness. The US military is worried about how to “attribute actions” in space – basically answering the question, “who is shooting at me?”  Here is one example, the military is worried about the idea of “grappler spacecraft” (among other ASATs) launched by peer adversaries months/years before a given conflict. When called into action the grapplers adjust their orbits (which have been benign up until now) and attach themselves to US military satellites disrupting their functionality. If the grapplers had been launched at the start of the conflict, figuring out who owns them would be fairly straight forward (thank you JSpOC). But if the grapplers had been launched months or years earlier, a small orbit adjustment just prior to attack may not be noticed by ground tracking stations making a surprise anonymous attack on US space assets a real possibility.

**What the US needs is a way to view their own satellites in space.** Can a cubesat (6U, 12U, or ESPA ring) fulfill such a mission? Can a New Space company build me an OBSERVER?

• A Cubesat with HD Video camera launched to LEO well before a conflict started (immediate market)
• One or two OBSERVERs per satellite the US military wants SSA on (perhaps two OBSERVERS per military sat for redundancy)
• Stay back far enough to avoid collision risk with very expensive Govt satellites
• Too small to be targeted by ground lasers or grappler spacecraft
• Carry a suite of observation technologies focused not on earth, but only a few hundred meters away on their target satellite
• Yes, rendezvous
• No, Docking
• Not even precision flying, but almost. OBSERVERS would need to be able to modify their orbits as needed to provide alternate views of its assigned target
• Once the OBSERVER can service LEO customers, how about version 2.0 to service MEO, and GEO?

The year is 2022, with OBSERVERs in place near all high value LEO military sats (now being launched on NanoSat Launchers), US adversaries know that any sneak attack in space using space assets would be caught on video. If an attack does occur, NLV’s can be launched quickly to temporarily replace lost US capabilities. The military can attribute actions and the effectiveness of ASAT weapons is severely hampered. Thanks New Space.

LEO-to-GEO Tug Part 2: Bigger than a Delta-IV Heavy

LEO-to-GEO Tug Part 2: Bigger than a Delta-IV Heavy

Sepatuads.com   Desember 26, 2010   Comment  

3,000kg DirecTV 12 Sat

In my last post, I showed the potential of using SpaceX’s Falcon 9 to launch a comsat to LEO and use a reusable LEO-to-GEO transfer tug to move the satellite from low earth orbit to GEO. I also described the largest satellite we can currently put into GEO in a single launch would be a 6,276kg satellite launched on a Delta-IV Heavy for $200M.

But how large of a GEO satellite would be possible using the Falcon 9/Transfer Tug architecture? And how expensive would that satellite be to launch?

Such a Falcon/tug system could launch a 10,000 kg satellite (an increase of ~59% over the current maximum comsat size) into GEO for $171-235M. The price/KG savings is significant ranging from 26-46% over the Delta-IV Heavy. In addition to cost/KG savings, no other commercial launcher can lift 10,000kg to GEO.

Here are my Assumptions:

• Tug is launched on Falcon 9 with a dry mass of 3,000kg.
• Tug is co-manifested on a Falcon 9. Launch cost $20M.
• Tug Development paid for under contract and not a part of this analysis.
• Tug Manufacturing Costs: $50M
• Tug refuels itself as needed in LEO from additional Falcon 9 launches (10,000 kg of prop for $50M: $5,000 per kg).
• Tug lasts five years with amortization factored into price.
• Tug breakeven price listed in this analysis.
• Two missions per year assumed (8% Market Share).
• Operating Cost per year: $10M.
• LEO to GEO: 4200 m/s of delta-v required.
• GEO to LEO (with aerobraking): 1500 m/s of delta-v required.
• Use aerobraking from GEO to LEO.
• Satellite launched to LEO on a Falcon 9.

LOX/Kerosene Tug – 10,000kg to GEO details:

LOX/Hydrogen Tug 10,000kg to GEO Details:

Click here to play with the interactive spreadsheets.

In Part 3 of this series, I will discuss if a Falcon/Tug system could be used to take a Bigelow Sundancer Module to EML1.